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Balancing the Economic and Artistic 
Issues Raised by the Martha Graham 
Copyright Case 
Sharon Connelly* 
 
We have all walked the high wire of circumstance at times.  
We recognize the gravity pull . . . as [the acrobat] does.  
The smile is there because he is practicing living at that 
instant of danger.  He does not choose to fall. 
                                                     Martha Graham (1894–1991)1 
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 1 MARTHA GRAHAM, BLOOD MEMORY 5 (1991).  Graham’s dance technique, by 
contrast, contains a series of falls, because “‘[w]hen one physically rises from the ground, 
it empowers the possibility of beginning again.’” Jennifer Dunning, Still Paying Heed to 
Graham’s Cry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, § 2, at 18 (quoting Pearl Lang, choreographer 
and former lead performer in the Martha Graham Dance Company). 
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INTRODUCTION 
By upholding a district court ruling that has been condemned 
as a dangerous precedent by many in the dance community,2 the 
Second Circuit has affirmed that Martha Graham’s nonprofit 
creation, the Martha Graham Center for Contemporary Dance 
(“Center”), owns the rights to the bulk of her work.3  The ruling is 
an affront to the accepted tenets of the dance world, where there 
has “always been the assumption . . . that the choreographer owns 
his or her own work and can leave that work to whomever he or 
she would like to.”4  Even more unsettling to many in the field was 
the determination by the court that the Center was the “statutory 
‘author’”—for purposes of copyright—of works created while 
Graham was Artistic Director of the Center.5 
 
 2 See Brief of Amici Curiae American Dance Festival, Inc. et al. at 2, 11, Martha 
Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 
380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-9451(L)) (This brief was filed on behalf of the 
American Dance Festival; Gerald Arpino, co-founder and Artistic Director of the Joffrey 
Ballet of Chicago; and Gordon Davidson, Artistic Director of the Center Theatre 
Group/Mark Taper Forum of the Los Angles County Music Center).  The Amici Curiae 
warned that the district court’s decision would have “far-reaching implications in the art 
world” and “turn[ed] the rationale of the work-for-hire doctrine on its head.” Id. at 2. 
 3 Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary 
Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 647 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3570 
(U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-1277) [hereinafter Graham IV] (This case was argued 
before Circuit Judges Newman, Kearse, and Pooler on January 29, 2004.  It was decided 
on August 18, 2004.); see also Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha 
Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 612–13 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002), aff’d in part, 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Graham III]. 
 4 Jennifer Dunning, Dance and Profit: Who Gets It?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2003, at 
B9 [hereinafter Dunning, Dance and Profit] (quoting Charles Reinhart, Director of the 
American Dance Festival).  “The whole structure of the Martha Graham Dance Company 
and its legal entities was to support Martha, not the other way around.” Id.; see also 
Jennifer Dunning, Hearings Start in Suit over Graham Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 
2001, at E8 [hereinafter Dunning, Hearings Start] (“[L]eading and innovative 
choreographers like Graham, George Balanchine, Merce Cunningham and Paul Taylor 
have long been assumed to own their work rather than to be employees hired by the 
institutions they worked with and created.”). 
 5 Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 634, 641–42 (holding that the Center, as Graham’s 
employer, was the legal “author,” whereas Graham, as the creator of the work, was the 
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Ronald Protas, Graham’s legatee and her successor as Artistic 
Director, claimed the rights to her work and instigated the suit 
against the nonprofit Center which had supported and maintained 
Graham’s choreography since 1948.6  At issue in this case were the 
copyrights to seventy choreographic works created by Martha 
Graham between the early 1920s and her death in 1991.7  The main 
issue on appeal was whether the work-for-hire doctrine applied to 
works choreographed by the primary artistic employee of a 
nonprofit corporation that was “created to serve the creative 
endeavors of an artistic genius.”8  The Second Circuit upheld the 
application of the work-for-hire doctrine to works created after 
1966 while Graham was a full-time employee of the Center, during 
which time her contractual duties as Artistic Director included 
choreography.9 
While the primary question considered in the case was whether 
Graham actually owned the rights to her work at the time of her 
death, the overriding issue seemed to be whether her beneficiary 
should be allowed to remove those works from the nonprofit dance 
company she had founded.  Consequently, the court’s decision 
may have been influenced by the fundamental equitable 
consideration of who deserves to own these works.  A finding in 
favor of the Center, which had served as incubator and home to the 
work for more than fifty years, would likely insure continued life 
for the works through performance and preservation.  In contrast, a 
finding in favor of Protas, who had refused to allow the Martha 
Graham Dance Company to perform any of Graham’s works after 
his removal as Artistic Director of the Center, would possibly 
leave no single living repository for the work and might place the 
 
“author” in the colloquial sense); see also Dunning, Dance & Profit, supra note 4 (“It has 
been hard for some in dance to reconcile the image of Graham as a pioneering artist in 
American modern dance, an art known for its unruly independence, with the idea of a 
choreographer as a negotiating employee . . . .”); infra notes 138–40 and accompanying 
text. 
 6 See discussion infra Parts I.A–B. 
 7 Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 570.  Although Graham choreographed 180 works 
during her lifetime, only seventy are “fixed in a tangible medium of expression from 
which they can be reproduced.” See id. 
 8 Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 628 (quoting Brief for Plaintiff-Counter-Claimant-Appellant 
Martha Graham School and Dance Foundation at 20, Graham IV (No. 02-9451(L))). 
 9 See id. at 628, 639–41. 
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dances in danger of disappearing forever from the public eye.10  
Although these concerns were not cited as reasons for the court’s 
holding, their underlying presence was inescapable. 
According to custom within the dance community, a 
choreographer is presumed by her peers to “own” her 
choreography, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.11  
Choreographers creating under the auspices of nonprofit 
organizations have previously willed their works to other parties 
without question, and their beneficiaries, motivated by a respect 
for the work and a desire to see it preserved and performed, have 
licensed or sold the works to the companies for which the dances 
had been created.12  In the present case, a rift between Protas and 
the Center led to the legal challenge and a ruling that questions the 
tradition and custom of a field subject to little prior legal 
interference. 
This Note uses the work-for-hire portion of the Graham ruling 
as a catalyst for exploring the legalities and realities of control 
within “artist-driven”13 nonprofit organizations.  Part I introduces 
the parties involved in the Graham dispute, defines “artist-driven” 
nonprofit organizations, surveys the development of copyright 
protection within the field of dance, and provides an overview of 
the Graham case.  Part II examines the relevant legalities of 
control, focusing first on the application of the work-for-hire 
doctrine to Graham’s works and then explaining related nonprofit 
 
 10 See Paul Ben-Itzak, If Protas Wins, Martha Will Die a Second Death, DANCE 
INSIDER (May 7, 2002), at http://www.danceinsider.com/f2002/f0507_1.html 
(“[P]ractically speaking, if the Graham work is consigned to Protas—a non-artist who has 
never taken a dance class in his life, and who would have difficulty finding a real Graham 
dancer to stage the work—it could indeed be relegated to the dustbin of history.”). 
 11 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 12 Alvin Ailey, José Limón, George Balanchine, and Jerome Robbins, for example, did 
not leave their works to the nonprofit dance companies with which they were affiliated, 
the Alvin Ailey American Dance Theater, José Limón Dance Company, and New York 
City Ballet (Balanchine and Robbins), respectively.  See infra notes 111–12 and 
accompanying text. 
 13 An “artist-driven” organization’s programs and activities primarily revolve around 
the work of a founding artist or artists. See discussion infra Part I.C.  This Note will not 
consider the rights of non-founding artists hired by nonprofit organizations, as these 
artists more clearly resemble “employees.”  They do not wield the same level of control 
over the organization as do founding artists, and their rights are generally subject to 
specific contract terms. 
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and moral rights considerations that are significant in analyzing the 
precedent set by this case.  Part III interprets the Graham decision 
through a prism of nonprofit, moral rights, and equitable 
considerations and suggests that: (1) the economic rights of 
nonprofit organizations ultimately benefit their founding artists; (2) 
a constraint on an artist’s right to transfer copyright ownership at 
the time of her death might be viewed as a fair exchange for the 
benefits provided to the artist by a nonprofit organization; (3) 
artistic control, which is not a feature of U.S. copyright law but is 
often of primary concern to artists, may be analogous to the “moral 
rights” recognized in other countries and, to a limited extent, 
within the United States; and (4) founding artists generally have 
the freedom and power to contract to retain rights to their works. 
This Note concludes that the precedent set by the Graham 
ruling, that copyright vests in a nonprofit employer in the absence 
of an agreement to the contrary, does not necessarily undercut the 
rights that are of primary concern to artists.  Not only may this 
presumed employer ownership be overruled by memorializing the 
parties’ specific intentions in a written agreement, but it is also 
possible that an artist’s primary interests may be better protected 
by a nonprofit organization created by the artist specifically to 
nurture, advance, and preserve her work. 
I. SETTING THE STAGE 
The artist is doom eager, but never chooses his fate.  He is 
chosen, and anointed, and caught.14 
A. Martha Graham, the Center, and the School 
Martha Graham, one of the leading dancers and choreographers 
of the twentieth century, “forever changed the way American 
performers move and dance.”15  She began dancing in the early 
 
 14 GRAHAM, supra note 1, at 118. 
 15 SACRAMENTO BEE, People of the Century: Candidates Biographies, at 
http://www.sacbee.com/static/archive/news/projects/people_of_century/entertainers/inde
x.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2005); see also Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. 
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1920s and by 1926, Graham had given her first public performance 
of her own works, eventually forming a performance troupe that 
became known as the Martha Graham Dance Company 
(“Company”).16  The Company was run as a sole proprietorship, 
and Graham’s choreography was initially financed by 
commissions.17  Graham performed with the Company from its 
inception until the late 1960s (at which time Graham was in her 
seventies) and choreographed more than 180 works.18  “Her fierce 
choreography sometimes amazed and sometimes horrified, but in it 
she embodied modern dance—arrogantly and spectacularly.”19 
When Graham began teaching in New York in 1926, she 
developed her own system of dance movements and exercises 
 
Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 512, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001), aff’d, 43 Fed. Appx. 408 (2d Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Graham I]. 
Her uniquely American vision and creative genius earned her numerous honors 
and awards such as the Laurel Leaf of the American Composers Alliance in 
1959 for her service to music.  Her colleagues in theater, the members of the 
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees Local One, voted her the 
recipient of the 1986 Local One Centennial Award for dance, not to be awarded 
for another 100 years. In 1976, President Gerald R. Ford bestowed upon 
Martha Graham the United States’ highest civilian honor, the Medal of 
Freedom, and declared her a “National Treasure,” making her the first dancer 
and choreographer to receive this honor.  Another Presidential honor was 
awarded Martha Graham in 1985 when President Ronald Reagan designated 
her among the first recipients of the United States’ National Medal of Arts. 
Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance, Biography of Martha Graham, at 
http://www.marthagrahamdance.org/us/#Bio (last visited Jan. 27, 2005) [hereinafter 
Biography of Martha Graham]. 
 16 See Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 515. 
 17 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624, 629 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73 
U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-1277).  Early patrons of Graham included 
Lila Acheson Wallace, Joan Davidson, Katharine Cornell, Baroness Bethsabée de 
Rothschild, Doris Duke, and Halston. See GRAHAM, supra note 1, at 6, 134, 145–47, 181, 
267–69; Anna Kisselgoff, Rebuilding the Martha Graham Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
1999, § 2, at 1. 
 18 See ABOUT MARTHA GRAHAM, MARTHA GRAHAM DANCE CO. AT CITY CENT., 
PLAYBILL, Vol. 120, No. 5 (May 2004).  Graham’s last complete dance, Maple Leaf Rag, 
was premiered in the year before Graham’s death. See PROGRAM NOTES, MARTHA 
GRAHAM DANCE CO. AT CITY CENT., PLAYBILL, Vol. 120, No. 5 (May 2004). 
 19 Terry Teachout, The Time 100: Martha Graham, TIME, June 8, 1998, at 200, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/time100/artists/profile/graham.html (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2005). 
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known as the Martha Graham Technique.20  “Using the principles 
of contraction and release as the foundation for her technique, 
Martha Graham built a vocabulary of movement that would 
increase the emotional activity of the dancer’s body.”21  Around 
1930, Graham opened the Martha Graham School of Dance, a sole 
proprietorship through which she taught her Technique.22 
Graham established the Martha Graham Foundation for 
Contemporary Dance (“Foundation”) as a nonprofit corporation in 
1948.23  “The Foundation was created to support modern dance by 
promoting and disseminating the Martha Graham technique, as 
well as raising funds for performances of the Martha Graham 
Dance Company.”24  In 1956, Graham incorporated the Martha 
Graham School of Contemporary Dance (“School”) and 
subsequently sold her sole proprietorship dance school, including 
its name, assets, and goodwill, to the newly incorporated School.25  
 
 20 See Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 515; Biography of Martha Graham, supra note 15.  
“I did not teach the technique classes that I learned at the Denishawn school [of Ruth St. 
Denis and Ted Shawn] for the simple reason that I could not afford the five-hundred-
dollar fee they demanded from anyone who taught their method.” GRAHAM,  supra note 
1, at 120. 
 21 Biography of Martha Graham, supra note 15 (internal quotations omitted). 
Martha left a magnificent legacy in a unique technique. . . . A technique of how 
to train the interior of the body, the visceral center of the torso that reacts to the 
range of emotional experience.  Whether it is fear or anger or sobbing or 
laughing, the center informs the rest of the movement and gives it a deep 
resonance.  
Dunning, supra note 1 (quoting Pearl Lang). 
 22 See Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 515.  Graham’s students included many who 
would become major modern dance choreographers in their own right—Merce 
Cunningham, Paul Taylor, and Twyla Tharp, to name a few—as well as actors such as 
Bette Davis, Gregory Peck, Liza Minelli, Woody Allen, Joanne Woodward, and Tony 
Randall. See also GRAHAM, supra note 1, at 120; Biography of Martha Graham, supra 
note 15. 
 23 See Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 515.  The Foundation was incorporated under New 
York state law. See id. 
 24 Id. at 525.  “The Center was established for . . . the dual purposes of enabling the 
creation and performance of choreography by Graham and perpetuating and preserving 
Graham’s work after her death.” Brief for Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellees at 
10, Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-9451(L)) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). 
 25 Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 526. 
The purposes of the School, as stated in its certificate of incorporation were to, 
inter alia, “teach the science and art of the dance,” and “in conjunction with the 
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Graham was not employed by either organization in any capacity 
prior to 1956,26 although eventually Graham’s works were 
exclusively created through these organizations.27 
In 1968, the Foundation’s name was changed to the Martha 
Graham Center of Contemporary Dance.28  The Center served as 
an umbrella organization for the incorporated School and the 
unincorporated Company.29  Although separately incorporated, the 
Center and the School largely operated as a single entity.30  By 
1980, the two corporations filed combined statements and had 
identical boards of trustees.31  Graham served as Artistic Director 
and a board member of both the Center and the School from 1966 
until her death in 1991.32  Graham’s responsibilities as Artistic 
Director were “to create new dances, to maintain the repertory of 
dances, to rehearse the company, and to supervise the School.”33 
B. The Protas Factor 
Ronald Protas met Martha Graham in 1967, when he was 
twenty-six and she was seventy-three, and they developed a close 
 
conduct of such school . . . to compose, perform and demonstrate, and to 
commission the composition, performance and demonstration of dances, 
ballets, dramas and music.” 
Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d in part, 380 F.3d 624 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (quoting the School’s Certificate of Incorporation).  Graham’s accountant had 
advised her “to form this new not-for-profit entity because . . . contributions to the School 
would be tax-deductible.” Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 526. 
 26 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 637. 
 27 See id. at 629. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See id. at 629 n.2; Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 572.  Today, the Center “provides 
the Martha Graham School (a separate . . . organization that shares the same Board of 
Trustees), the Martha Graham Dance Company and the Martha Graham Resources with 
fundraising and marketing support and legal, financial and audit services.” Martha 
Graham Center of Contemporary Dance, Mission & Programs, at http://www.martha-
grahamdance.org/us/#Mission (last visited Jan. 27, 2005). 
 30 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 629 n.2. 
 31 See id.; Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 572. 
 32 See Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d 512, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 43 Fed. Appx. 408 
(2d Cir. 2002). 
 33 Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 573 (emphasis added).  Judge Cedarbaum concluded 
that Center board members “Francis Mason, Judith Schlosser, and Lee Traub . . . testified 
credibly that Graham’s responsibilities during her employment included the creation of 
dances.” Id. 
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friendship.34  Although he had no prior training in dance, Protas 
had become Executive Director of the Center and had joined the 
boards of both the Center and the School by the mid-1970s; he 
became Co-Associate Artistic Director of the Center around 
1980.35  Protas eventually gained control of the board of 
directors.36  Graham trusted Protas, “whom I have trained over the 
years to oversee my works and to whom I have entrusted the future 
of my company. . . . He knows deeply the roles I have created and 
can intuit what I want.”37 
When Graham died in 1991, Protas succeeded her as Artistic 
Director of the Center and the School.38  Graham’s last will, 
executed on January 19, 1989, did not specify what Graham owned 
at the time of her death but named Protas as executor and residuary 
legatee.39  Although Protas had been advised by his attorney and 
others to investigate what rights he had acquired under Graham’s 
will, he made no such investigation.40  Nevertheless, he 
represented to his fellow directors at the Center that he owned the 
exclusive rights to Martha Graham’s works.41  The other board 
 
 34 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 629; Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 516. 
 35 See Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 516. 
 36 Cf. id.  “Protas had the ‘final say’ on who could or could not be a board member: ‘He 
put them on and took them off.’” Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 575 (quoting Center 
board member Lee Traub). 
 37 GRAHAM, supra note 1, at 11. 
 38 See Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 516. 
 39 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 629; Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 576.  Graham’s will 
included the following provisions: 
The residue . . . of all my property, real and personal, of every kind and 
description and wherever situated, including all property over which I may 
have power of appointment at the time of my death . . . and including all 
property not otherwise effectively disposed of hereunder . . . I give, devise and 
bequeath to my said friend, Ron Protas, if he shall survive me, or, if he shall not 
survive me, to the Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance, Inc. 
 
In connection with any rights or interests in any dance works, musical scores, 
scenery sets, my personal papers and the use of my name, which may pass to 
my said friend Ron Protas . . . I request, but do not enjoin, that he consult with 
my friends, Linda Hodes, Diane Gray, Halston, Ted Michaelson, Alex Racolin 
and Lee Traub, regarding the use of such rights or interests. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 40 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 630; Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 516. 
 41 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 630. 
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members trusted Protas and accepted his representations.42  In 
1998, Protas created the Martha Graham Trust (“Trust”), of which 
he was trustee and sole beneficiary, to license Graham’s works.43 
In response to an increasingly strained relationship with Protas 
and difficulty with fundraising, the Center attempted to persuade 
Protas to resign as Artistic Director in July 1999 by entering into a 
ten-year licensing agreement with the Trust.44  The licensing 
agreement, inter alia, gave the Center a non-exclusive license to 
perform Graham’s dances; in return, the Center agreed to keep 
Protas on the board, pay him a salary for ten years, and credit him 
as Artistic Consultant.45  An implicit term of the licensing 
agreement was that Protas was to resign as the Center’s Artistic 
Director.46  When Protas had not resigned nearly a year later, the 
board voted to remove him as Artistic Director.47  Facing 
continued financial problems, the Center suspended operations on 
May 25, 2000.48  That same day, Protas terminated the license 
agreement between the Trust and the Center.49  Protas was 
removed from the Center’s board on June 22, 2000.50 “Following 
Protas’ departure, the Center and the School received a significant 
amount of funding . . . and a grant for the renovation of the 
 
 42 See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 577 (quoting board chairman Francis Mason).  
“The [other directors] trusted him and relied on him to perform in good faith the high 
duty of loyalty of a fiduciary.  Protas had a fiduciary duty not to appropriate to himself 
corporate opportunities that might belong to the [Center].” Id. at 610 (citing Sharp v. 
Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 122 (1976)). 
 43 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 630. 
 44 See id.; Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 579; see also Deborah Jowitt, Dance—
Honoring the Founding Vision, and Moving On; When a Company’s Creator is Gone, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1998, § 2, at 1.  “Mr. Protas, in his zeal to promote and protect 
Graham and her masterpieces during her lifetime, seems to have offended quite a few 
presenters and donors.” Id. 
 45 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 630.  The licensing agreement also granted “the Center 
an exclusive license to teach the Martha Graham technique, and a non-exclusive 
license . . . to use sets, costumes[,] and properties; to use Graham’s images; and to use the 
Martha Graham trademark.” Id. 
 46 See id. 
 47 See Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 519. 
 48 See id. 
 49 See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 580. 
 50 See id. 
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Center’s and the School’s premises. . . . The School reopened on 
January 16, 2001.”51 
After his removal from the board of the Center, Protas founded 
the nonprofit Martha Graham School and Dance Foundation 
(“School and Dance Foundation”), to which the Trust granted an 
exclusive license to license performances of Graham’s dances.52  
Protas filed suit through the nonprofit Martha Graham School and 
Dance Foundation on January 12, 2001, to enjoin the Center, inter 
alia, from performing seventy of Graham’s dances choreographed 
between 1926 and 1991.53 
To understand the many facets of the case and the field’s 
reaction to the ruling, it is essential to understand the general 
structure of the field of dance and the development of copyright 
protection for works of choreography. 
C. Artist-Driven Organizations within the Nonprofit Rubric 
“Artists are . . . inextricably tied to not-for-profit 
organizations,” which provide a structure, a home, and financing 
for artistic works.54  Most dance companies, including the Center, 
are incorporated under state not-for-profit law55 and receive tax-
exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”).56  
 
 51 Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 519. 
 52 Id.  The Trust also granted the School and Dance Foundation an exclusive license to 
establish a school under Graham’s name. Id. 
 53 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624, 630 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73 
U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-1277).  Protas also sought to enjoin the 
Center from using the Martha Graham trademark and teaching the Martha Graham 
Technique. See id; Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 514; see also infra note 113 and 
accompanying text.  Protas also asserted rights to the costumes and sets from some of 
Graham’s dances. See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 569. 
 54 Brief of Amici Curiae American Dance Festival, Inc. et al. at 3, Graham IV, 380 
F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-9451(L)). 
 55 The Center was incorporated under New York Membership Corporation Law, “the 
statutory predecessor of the current Not-For-Profit Corporation Law.” Graham I, 153 F. 
Supp. 2d at 515; see N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 201(b) (McKinney 1997 & 
Supp. 2005) (“A not-for-profit corporation . . . may be formed for any one or more of the 
following non-business purposes: charitable, educational, religious, scientific, literary, 
cultural . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 56 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2004) (requiring that an organization be “organized and 
operated exclusively for [exempt purposes]. . .” to qualify for the tax exemption provided 
for in the same section); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c)(3)-1(d) (1990).  In addition to 
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Federal tax exemption is granted to such organizations due to their 
charitable purposes since they serve the public good rather than a 
private interest.57  Arts and cultural organizations have been 
recognized as having an educational purpose, one of the 
enumerated exempt purposes in the Code.58  From an economic 
perspective, the nonprofit structure may be an artist’s only 
financial option, especially “where significant resources must be 
marshaled for an artist’s vision to be realized.”59  Changes in the 
available funding streams for the arts in the mid-twentieth century 
increasingly channeled the formation of arts organizations into the 
nonprofit structure.60  The majority of foundation and corporate 
grant-making programs authorize donations only to nonprofit, tax-
 
tax exemption, arts organizations generally qualify to receive tax-deductible donations 
under section 170 of the Code. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (2004).  The tax deduction 
for charitable contributions was adopted in 1917 in response to the fear that higher tax 
rates would cause philanthropy to decline. See JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARTZ, 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 308 (1st ed. 1995). 
 57 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (stating that an exempt organization must 
serve “a public, rather than a private, interest”); see also generally Summers v. Cherokee 
Children & Family Servs., Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that two 
nonprofit public benefit corporations formed to perform child care services of their 
executive director had abandoned any public or charitable purposes). 
 58 See Rev. Rul. 64-175, 1964-1 C.B. 185.  A nonprofit corporation organized “to 
stimulate, promote, and develop the interest of the American public in the dramatic arts 
and which operates a permanent repertory theatre” was found to be educational, much in 
“the same manner as a symphony orchestra is considered educational.” Id.  Symphony 
orchestras are one of the examples of educational organization listed in the regulations. 
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii); see also Rev. Rul. 73-45, 1973-1 C.B. 220 
(holding that “a nonprofit organization created to foster the development . . . of an 
appreciation for drama and musical arts by sponsoring professional presentations 
qualifies for exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Code”); Rev. Rul. 64-174, 1964-1 
C.B. 183 (holding that a foundation established to create interest in American theatre was 
an exempt organization under section 501(c)(3)). 
 59 Brief of Amici Curiae American Dance Festival, Inc. et al. at 3, Graham IV (No. 02-
9451(L)). 
 60 See John Kreidler, Leverage Lost: The Nonprofit Arts in the Post-Ford Era, IN 
MOTION MAG., Feb. 16, 1996, at pt. 2, http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/lost.html.  
These changes included the establishment of arts grants by the Ford Foundation, 
Carnegie Foundation, The Rockefeller Foundation, and The Andrew W. Mellon 
Foundation, as well as the formation of the National Endowment for the Arts (“NEA”) in 
1965 (which led to the formation of state arts agencies in all states by 1980, followed by 
the formation of more than 3000 local arts agencies). See id.  Most NEA grants to arts 
organizations also required matching support and served to stimulate a broad base of 
funding from individual and institutional sources. See id. 
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exempt organizations, and the tax deduction available to 
individuals provides a strong incentive to restrict their philanthropy 
to nonprofit organizations.61 
The defining characteristic of a nonprofit organization is the 
“nondistribution constraint” (also known as the “private inurement 
doctrine”), which means that such organizations may not distribute 
income or assets to shareholders, owners, directors, or officers.62 
Just as the goal of a for-profit corporation is to make 
money for its investors, the goal of a not-for-profit is to 
make money that can be spent on furthering its [exempt 
purpose] objectives. . . . What distinguishes a not-for-profit 
is not whether it receives money, but what it does with the 
money.63 
Many choreographers are employed by nonprofit organizations 
which they have founded.  Such organizations are frequently 
referred to as “artist-driven” organizations, and their programs and 
activities primarily revolve around the work of their founding 
artists.64  The primary purposes of such organizations are generally 
to support, utilize, and preserve the work of the founding artist.65 
A nonprofit organization is legally controlled by its board 
members, who bear ultimate fiduciary responsibility for the 
 
 61 N.Y. Found. for the Arts, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.nyfa.org-
/level3.asp?id=64&fid=1&sid=44 (last visited Jan. 27, 2005) (“Individual artists and new 
organizations face genuine obstacles when seeking the funding necessary to continue and 
complete their work.”). 
 62 See VICTORIA B. BJORKLUND ET AL., NEW YORK NONPROFIT LAW AND PRACTICE: 
WITH TAX ANALYSIS § 1-2 & n.16 (1997 & Supp. 2005); see also 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) 
(2004) (stating that no part of the net earnings of an exempt organization may inure “to 
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual”); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW 
§§ 102(a)(5), 204, 508, 515(a) (McKinney 1997 & Supp. 2005). 
 63 BJORKLUND ET AL., supra note 62, § 1-2 n.17 (quoting Am. Baptist Churches of 
Metro. N.Y. v. Galloway, 710 N.Y.S.2d 12, 15 (App. Div. 2000)). 
 64 See, e.g., Gregory Kandel, The Art in the Process of Planning, Nat’l Endowment for 
the Arts, http://www.nea.gov/resources/Lessons/kandel1.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2004) 
(listing a modern dance company that has a single choreographer as an example of an 
artist driven organization). 
 65 The Center and the School, for example, are nonprofit “educational institutions 
which contribute to the advancement of the art of dance and Martha Graham’s legacy.” 
Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d 512, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 43 Fed. Appx. 408 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
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management of the organization.66  In many artist-driven 
organizations, however, the board will defer to the wishes of the 
founding artist.67  Deference to the artist may be justified as an 
application of the board’s business judgment68 in serving the 
mission of the organization, which often revolves around the 
founding artist’s work.69 
Graham exercised unfettered artistic control over the Center.70  
Although the Center’s board of directors bore ultimate fiduciary 
responsibility for the organization, the board did not interfere with 
Graham’s artistic decisions and understood its role and the role of 
the Center to be one of support for Graham.71  The board’s deferral 
of control to Graham was a significant consideration both in the 
court’s application of the work-for-hire doctrine and in the field’s 
reaction to the ruling. 
 
 66 See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §§ 701, 717 (McKinney 1997 & Supp. 2005). 
 67 See, e.g., Jennifer Dunning, Suit Over Graham’s Dances Moves into a New Phase, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2002, at E4 [hereinafter Dunning, Suit Over Graham’s Dances].  
The Second Circuit conceded that “as the revered doyenne, Graham held remarkable 
sway over the Center’s Board of Directors.” Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624, 640 (2d Cir. 
2004), petition for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-1277). 
 68 A board’s decisions will not be second-guessed by the court so long as the directors 
discharge the duties of their positions “in good faith and with that degree of diligence, 
care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances 
in like positions.” N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 717(a).  Board members are 
entitled to rely on the opinions of employees of the organization who are believed to be 
“reliable and competent in the matters presented.” Id. § 717(b).  As a result, board 
members would be justified in relying on the opinions of an artistic director (such as 
Graham) in making artistic decisions. Cf. id. 
 69 See, e.g., Nationalist Movement v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 558, 574 (1994), aff’d, 37 F.3d 
216 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Substantial domination of an organization by its founder does not 
necessarily disqualify the organization from [tax-exempt status].”); see also Rev. Rul. 66-
259, 1966-2 C.B. 214 (noting that the mere fact that the creator of an organization has 
control will not, in itself, prevent the organization from qualifying for exemption.). 
 70 See infra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 71 See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d in part, 380 F.3d 
624 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Dunning, Suit Over Graham’s Dances, supra note 67 
(“Francis Mason, the chairman of the center’s board, described that organization as an 
informal family that existed to enable Graham to create and maintain dances.”). 
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D. Copyright Protection and the Field of Dance 
1. Historic Overview 
“Custom . . . draws its strength from the consent of those who 
agree to be bound by it.”72  As members of a “close-knit, protective 
community,”73 American choreographers have long yielded to their 
self-imposed rules, and the custom of the dance community 
continues to offer a means of recognizing and protecting the rights 
of choreographers.74 
There is little case law in the field of choreography.75  The few 
early choreography cases dealt not with ownership or 
infringement, but with whether the works at issue were even 
eligible for copyright protection.76  Prior to the enactment of the 
Copyright Act of 1976 (“1976 Act”),77 choreographic works were 
only eligible for copyright protection as a type of “dramatic 
composition.”78  To qualify as such, the movement had to be used 
to tell a story—abstract work was not eligible for protection79—
 
 72 Barbara A. Singer, In Search of Adequate Protection for Choreographic Works: 
Legislative and Judicial Alternatives vs. the Custom of the Dance Community, 38 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 287, 319 (1984). 
 73 Id. at 291. 
 74 See id. at 319. 
 75 See Anne K. Weinhardt, Copyright Infringement of Choreography: The Legal 
Aspects of Fixation, 13 J. CORP. L. 839, 842 (1988).  As of 1984, “not one case involving 
a statutory copyright of choreography [had] yet reached an American court of law.” 
Singer, supra note 72, at 290 n.12. 
 76 See Fuller v. Bemis, 50 F. 926, 929 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892) (denying copyright 
protection to a choreographic work by modern dance pioneer Loie Fuller); see also 
Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 921 (C.C. Cal. 1867).  Although not specifically a 
“choreography” case, Martinetti dealt with the issue of whether a play, which “cannot be 
read . . .  a mere spectacle [that] must be seen to be appreciated,” was eligible for 
copyright protection. Id. 
 77 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2451 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 
U.S.C.). 
 78 See Singer, supra note 72, at 298.  The Regulations enacted under the Copyright Act 
of 1909, which was superseded by the Copyright Act of 1976, allowed “choreographic 
works of a dramatic character” to be registered under the section which provided for the 
registration of “dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions.” See id. n.46 (citing Joseph 
Taubman, Choreography under Copyright Revision: The Square Peg in the Round Hole 
Unpegged, 10 PERF. ARTS REV. 219, 220 (1980)). 
 79 See Fuller, 50 F. at 929.  In Fuller, copyright protection was denied to a work of 
choreography by modern dance pioneer Loie Fuller since the work was found to be 
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and the movement had to be “suited for public representation.”80  
Congress’ reluctance to grant protection to choreographic works 
may be attributable to the comparatively recent advent of written 
dance notation and videotape, which provided a reasonable means 
for fixing choreography in a tangible medium.81  The dance field 
also faced general public “resistance to the acceptance of abstract, 
non-literary dance as a worthy form of artistic expression.”82  Past 
courts have interpreted the Constitutional mandate limiting 
copyright protection to works that promote the “useful arts”83 as an 
“invitation to judge the moral worth of choreographic works.”84  In 
the 1886 case of Martinetti v. Maguire,85 the California circuit 
court proclaimed that although the court did not “pretend to be the 
 
“solely the devising of a series of graceful movements . . . telling no story, portraying no 
character, depicting no emotion.” Id. 
 80 See Martinetti, 16 F. Cas. at 922 (“In conferring [the] privilege or monopoly [of 
copyright] upon authors and inventors, I suppose that it is both proper and constitutional 
for congress so to legislate, as to encourage virtue and discourage immorality.”). 
 81 See Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Leon I. 
Mirell, Legal Protection for Choreography, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 792, 792–93 & nn.4–5 
(1952)); see also Leslie Erin Wallis, The Different Art: Choreography and Copyright, 33 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1442, 1445–46 (1986). 
 82 Horgan, 789 F.2d at 160 (citing Leon I. Mirell, Legal Protection for Choreography, 
27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 792, 806–07); see also Melanie Cook, Comment, Moving to a New 
Beat: Copyright Protection for Choreographic Works, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1287, 1288–
94 (1977).  “Concert dance in the United States didn’t command attention as a popular art 
form until well into the 20th century.” Joseph Carman, Who Owns a Dance? It Depends 
on the Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2001, at § 2, p. 28. 
 83 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings . . . .”). 
 84 Singer, supra note 72, at 299 & n.52 (citing Martinetti, 16 F. Cas. at 922 (finding 
that an “‘exhibition of women “lying about loose” or otherwise’ was indecent, corrupt, 
and in no way promoted the useful arts’”); Fuller, 50 F. at  92 (“The Fuller court was 
likewise wary of the seductive effect created by modern dance pioneer Loie Fuller as she 
swirled her skirts in her ‘Serpentine Dance.’”))  “As late as 1963 a court rejected 
protection of a choreographic work on [morality] grounds.” Id. at 299 n.52 (quoting Dane 
v. M & H Co., 136 U.S.P.Q. 426, 429 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963) (finding that a striptease 
dance number did not “tend to promote the progress of science of the useful arts” where 
the performance contained “nothing of a literary, dramatic or musical character which 
[was] calculated to elevate, cultivate, inform, or improve the moral or intellectual natures 
of the audience”)). 
 85 16 F. Cas. 920 (C.C. Cal. 1867). 
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conservator of the public morals . . . it [was] the duty of all courts 
to uphold public virtue.”86 
With the passage of the 1976 Act, which for the first time 
recognized choreography as a separate protectable category of 
work,87 Congress finally acknowledged what choreographers had 
long been aware of: that “choreography is neither drama nor 
storytelling.  It is a separate art.”88  Under the 1976 Act, all dances, 
even those that are non-narrative, are eligible for copyright so long 
as they are “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”89 
The 1985 case of Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc.,90 which dealt 
with the question of whether George Balanchine’s91 choreography 
could be infringed by photographs of his work, was the first case in 
which a choreographic copyright was alleged to have been 
infringed under the 1976 Act.92  Infringement case law relating to 
 
 86 Id. at 922.  Not all courts, however, have endorsed this puritanical view. See 
generally Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to 
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [artistic creations], outside of 
the narrowest and most obvious limits . . .  [S]ome works of genius would be 
sure to miss appreciation . . .  It may be more than doubted, for instance, 
whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure 
of protection when seen for the first time. 
Id. at 251–52. 
 87 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2004).  Section 102(a) provides that: 
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.  Works of 
authorship include . . . (4) pantomimes and choreographic works . . . . 
Id. 
 88 Nicholas Arcomano, The Copyright Law and Dance, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 11, 1981, § 2, 
at 8 (quoting Agnes de Mille from a comment she submitted to the Copyright Office in 
1959).  Ms. de Mille further elaborated that dance “is an arrangement in time-space, 
using human bodies as a unit design.  It may or may not be dramatic or tell a story.” Id. 
 89 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).  Dances are generally “fixed” on film, videotape, or notated 
scores. See generally Weinhardt, supra note 75. 
 90 621 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev’d, 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 91 George Balanchine, along with Lincoln Kirstein, co-founded the school that would 
serve as the incubator of the New York City Ballet in 1933. About NYCB, at 
http://www.nycballet.com/about/aboutnycb.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).  Balanchine 
served as ballet master and chief choreographer of the company from its inception in 
1948 until his death in 1983. See Horgan, 789 F.2d at 158. 
 92 See Wallis, supra note 81, at 1445 n.23. 
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choreography continues to remain scarce,93 and breaches of dance 
licensing agreements are rare as well.94  “Many choreographers 
maintain that the threat of ostracism from the dance community is 
sufficient to deter most potential breaches.”95  Therefore, custom 
continues to act as a formidable regulatory force within the field. 
For the vast majority of the field, there is little economic 
incentive driving considerations of intellectual property; thus, 
infringements rarely warrant litigation.96  “[T]he ‘economic 
remuneration of choreographers’ ha[s] not kept pace ‘with their 
creative achievements.’”97  Most choreographers make little from 
the performance or licensing of their work, so a suit based on 
actual damages or the infringer’s profits generally would be of 
little value.98  “[W]hatever the legality of the situation, most of the 
time the bottom line is the cost of litigation.  ‘The copyright law 
merely gives you the right to sue . . . . But lawsuits are enormously 
expensive.’”99 
Although choreographers have not often taken advantage of 
their legal right to assert ownership of their works, the addition of 
choreography to the Copyright Act was not in vain.  Recognizing 
choreography as a copyrightable form of expression has had great 
symbolic value and was a major step in the struggle for recognition 
of choreography as a unique and viable art form.  Nevertheless, the 
general elusiveness of dance continues to raise challenges in fitting 
choreography into the system of copyright protection. 
 
 93 See Weinhardt, supra note 75, at 843.  This remains true even though many 
choreographic works have been filmed, or notated and registered with the Copyright 
Office in the past decades. See id. 
 94 See Singer, supra note 72, at 295.  As of the January 1984 publication of Ms. 
Singer’s article, there were “apparently no recorded cases of actions for breach of a 
choreographic licensing agreement.” Id. at 295 n.34. 
 95 Id. at 296 n.36. 
 96 See id. at 296. 
 97 Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 161 (citing Cook, supra note 82, at 1287). 
 98 See Singer, supra note 72, at 305.  Under § 504 of the 1976 Act, a copyright owner is 
entitled to recover either (i) actual damages and the infringer’s profits or (ii) statutory 
damages that generally range from $750 to $30,000. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(b), 504(c)(1) 
(2004).  Statutory damages may be as high as $150,000 if the infringement is determined 
to have been willful. See id. § 504(c)(2). 
 99 Leslie Bennetts, Pirating of “The Pirates of Penzance,” N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1982, 
at C15 (quoting Wilford Leach, director of the New York Shakespeare Festival 
production of “The Pirates of Penzance”). 
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2. The Essence of “Owning” a Dance 
Determining the economic value of a dance copyright is a 
difficult task.  The value rests in the potential to exploit the rights 
secured by copyright by performing the work publicly, licensing 
performance rights to other dancers or dance companies, allowing 
the creation of derivative works of choreography, or authorizing 
derivative works in other media such as film, videotape, or 
television.100  It is often difficult to speculate what the future value 
will be, especially at the moment of creation when—for the vast 
majority of choreographers—the economic value may be minimal 
or non-existent.101  Determining the future value of a dance 
remains challenging even once a company or choreographer begins 
to license and receive income from the work.102 
In order to exploit the rights granted to a work of choreography 
by copyright, resources beyond the copyright itself are required.  
Access to the original work, one such resource, may be provided 
through tangible media such as film, videotape, and/or a notated 
score,103 or through the memory of the choreographer, original 
 
 100 Section 106 of the Copyright Act includes, among the exclusive rights protected by 
copyright, the rights to reproduce the work in copies and phonorecords, to prepare 
derivative works, to distribute copies to the public, and to perform and display the work 
publicly. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002). 
 101 Cf. DIANE M. ZORICH, MANAGING DIGITAL ASSETS: OPTIONS FOR CULTURAL AND 
EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 88–89 (1999) (Assessing the economic value of creative 
works requires consideration of the intended context and users of the work, the 
associative value, the rights conveyed to others, current events and timely associations, 
transformative use, and increased visibility.). 
 102 Cf. id.  The José Limón Dance Foundation, for example, does not place a financial 
value on its ownership of José Limón’s works, even though the company generates 
considerable revenue through licensing fees and the restaging of these works. Interview 
with Ann Vachon, Institute Director, Limón Institute, in New York, NY [hereinafter 
Vachon Interview] (Apr. 1, 2004) (on file with author).  “The idea of owning a dance as 
property is relatively new.” Jennifer Dunning, Warning: Ephemeral but Private Property; 
Notions of Ownership Tie Up Dance Legacies, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2000, at E1. 
 103 Notated dance scores function for dance the same way music scores function for 
music; dance notation captures in writing the direction, level and timing of movement, as 
well as the part of the body producing the movement. See Dance Notation Bureau, 
Notation Basics, at http://www.scottsutherland.com/DNB (last visited Jan. 27, 2005); 
Dance Notation Bureau, About DNB, at http://dancenotation.org/DNB (last visited Jan. 
27, 2005) [hereinafter Dance Notation Bureau, About DNB]. 
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performers, or other parties familiar with the work.104  Beyond 
access, utilization of the work requires the participation of 
someone with the technical expertise to translate the work from the 
film, videotape, score, or personal memory onto the bodies of 
dancers.105  Financial resources also are required to fund the 
reconstruction, resetting, and production of the work.106 
There must be some connection between the copyright itself 
and the other resources necessary to utilize the work, or the 
copyright has no functional value.  Nonprofit dance companies 
make excellent repositories for such resources, and there is 
enormous cultural value, beyond the economic value of the 
copyright itself, to keeping the work alive in the repertoire of a 
dance company.107  Carla Maxwell, Artistic Director of the 
 
 104 See Carman, supra note 82 (noting that “[a] distinct difference between the 
preservation of dance and other artistic media is that choreography often depends on an 
oral tradition to uphold its integrity through style, motivation and content”). 
 105 See Julie Charlotte Van Camp, Philosophical Problems of Dance Criticism 169 (Dec. 
1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University), http://www.csulb.edu-
/~jvancamp/diss.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2005) (“[M]any companies are finding 
themselves unable to perform certain works, because a rehearsal master who knows the 
ballet is unavailable to teach it to the company.”). 
 106 Common costs for reconstruction and resetting include studio space, dancer fees, and 
licensing fees; performance and/or documentation may incur additional costs, such as 
theater rental and videographer fees. See generally Dance Notation Bureau, Staging from 
the Score, at http://dancenotation.org/DNB (last visited Feb. 1, 2005). 
 107 “[T]he longer ballets are out of circulation, the more difficult it is to recreate them.” 
Carman, supra note 82. 
 Granted, these resources may also exist outside of an artist-driven nonprofit 
institution.  Organizations such as the nonprofit Dance Notation Bureau provide access to 
dance works of the past and serve as clearinghouses for the rights and documentation 
necessary to utilize choreographic works. See Dance Notation Bureau, About DNB, supra 
note 103.  The Dance Notation Bureau produces and houses notated dance scores by more 
than 160 artists including George Balanchine, Paul Taylor, Antony Tudor, Bill T. Jones, 
Doris Humphrey, William Forsythe, José Limón, and Laura Dean. Id.  “Each year DNB 
assists in staging some 40 works from scores.” Id. 
 The Balanchine Trust, a repository for the works of George Balanchine which was 
created by his legatees, retains ballet masters to set Balanchine works on more than 150 
companies around the world. See Carman, supra note 82. 
 Charles Woodford, son and heir of Doris Humphrey, who was not affiliated with a 
dance company at the time of her death, has secured the future of her dances without 
having a nonprofit organization at his disposal by utilizing the services of the Dance 
Notation Bureau and actively pursuing notation, licensing, and the reconstruction of 
Humphrey’s works on other dance companies. Telephone Interview with Charles 
Woodford (Apr. 15, 2004) (on file with author); see also Dunning, supra note 102.  To 
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nonprofit dance company of José Limón, a contemporary of 
Martha Graham, observed, “The overwhelming thing that hit us all 
when Jos[é] died was that if we disbanded, an entire lifetime of 
work was going to disappear.”108 
Due to the specific dance knowledge required to utilize works 
of choreography and to the lack of case law in the area of 
choreographic copyright protection, the customary views of 
ownership within the field carry great weight with choreographers. 
3. Presumption of Ownership within the Field 
Often, the fact that a choreographer owns and has the right to 
control his choreography is taken for granted within the 
contemporary American dance community.109  “[A]n artist in the 
process of creation injects his spirit into the work and . . . the 
artist’s personality . . . should therefore be . . . preserved.”110  This 
presumption has been affirmed when other choreographers, who 
had created dances under the auspices of nonprofit organizations, 
left their works to other parties and their bequests were not 
challenged.111  Following the deaths of José Limón in 1972, 
George Balanchine in 1983, Alvin Ailey in 1989, and Jerome 
Robbins in 1998, their beneficiaries licensed or sold the 
choreographers’ works to the companies for which they were 
created.112  The parties involved did not seek a legal determination 
 
preserve works under such circumstances requires extreme dedication and commitment 
on the part of the heir. 
 108 Jowitt, supra note 44.  “Artists of [Limón’s] generation didn’t concern themselves 
with business . . . ‘He really, really believed . . . that if he was good enough, somebody 
was going to come up and give him money.’ . . . He named no successor to lead [the 
company].  His will didn’t even mention his dances.” Id. (quoting Carla Maxwell, 
Artistic Director of Limón’s company since 1978). 
 109 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  “As George Balanchine explained, ‘I can 
do with my ballets whatever I like.  They are mine . . . I made them . . . .’” Singer, supra 
note 72, at 310 n.106 (citations omitted). 
 110 Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). 
 111 See Joseph Carman, Graham Center Victory, DANCE MAG., Nov. 1, 2002, at 20. 
 112 See Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 158 (2d Cir. 1986); Jowitt, supra note 
44; Alvin Ailey American Dance Theater, History, 1989, at http://alvinailey.org-
/history.asp?dateid=29 (last visited Apr. 20, 2005). 
 “Balanchine’s . . . will . . . left selected ballets to treasured dancers associated with 
them.  He also willed a bit of chaos to his legatees.” Jowitt, supra note 44.  He divided 
his body of work among several people, even splitting the American, foreign, and media 
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of copyright ownership; thus, the legal standard was not called into 
question. 
Respecting the custom of the field, the Center would likely 
have continued to pay Protas a licensing fee for use of Graham’s 
works while allowing him to reap the profits of licensing the works 
to other companies.  Graham’s right to leave her dances to Protas 
would have remained unquestioned had Protas not attempted to 
deny the Center access to the works. 
E. Overview of the Martha Graham Copyright Case113 
In January 2001, Protas filed suit against the Center and School 
under section 2201(a) of title 28 of the U.S. Code, seeking a 
 
rights of single ballets among different people. See id.  “Fortunately all of us cared for 
Mr. Balanchine, and all of us care for each other.” Id. (quoting Barbara Horgan, 
Balanchine’s executor).  The legatees created the George Balanchine Trust, which has 
streamlined the process of licensing Balanchine’s works. See Carman, supra note 82.  
After Jerome Robbins’s death, “he left his ballets in the hands of a trust that specified that 
a committee composed of trustees, ballet masters, and his close friends should oversee 
the licensing of his ballets.” Id.  “Generally meeting once a month, the Trust reviews 
requests for staging Robbins’s works.” Id.  The board of the Alvin Ailey American Dance 
Theater “bought the rights to Ailey’s dances from his mother, to whom [Ailey] had left” 
his work. See Dunning, supra note 102.  “The board felt the dances had to be owned by a 
nonprofit institution and not a single person who could sell [Ailey’s masterwork] 
Revelations to the Rockettes.” Id. (quoting Sharon Luckman, executive director of the 
Ailey company).  José Limón’s heirs sold the rights to Limón’s work to the José Limón 
Dance Foundation, the parent organization of the Limón Dance Company. Vachon 
Interview, supra note 102; see also Dunning, supra note 102. 
 Of course, the specific facts of the relationship between the choreographer and the 
dance company in each of the above situations may distinguish these choreographers’ 
rights from those of Graham.  In the case of Balanchine, for example, the New York City 
Ballet paid Balanchine a royalty each time the company performed his works. See 
Horgan, 789 F.2d at 158.  In Graham, the district court found that no credible evidence 
was offered to prove that Graham received royalties from the Center for use of her 
dances. See Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624, 641 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73 
U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-1277). 
 113 The Martha Graham copyright case was the second phase of Protas’s suit. See 
generally Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d in part, 380 F.3d 624 
(2d Cir. 2004).  The first phase of the suit dealt with trademark claims: Protas attempted 
to enjoin the Center and School from using the names under which they had been 
incorporated and from claiming to teach the “Martha Graham technique.” See Graham I, 
153 F. Supp. 2d 512, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 43 Fed. Appx. 408 (2d Cir. 2002).  
Protas was unsuccessful on all counts. See Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. 
Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 43 Fed. Appx. 408, 410 (2d Cir. 2002) 
[hereinafter Graham II]; Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 526–27. 
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declaratory judgment that: (1) none of the seventy dances in 
question were in the public domain, (2) he owned all rights in these 
works, and (3) unauthorized performance of these dances would 
constitute willful copyright infringement.114  The Center 
counterclaimed for a declaration of ownership of the works in 
question, arguing that it owned the dances via Graham’s 
assignment and the work-for-hire doctrine, and thus, Protas had not 
inherited any rights to these works.115  New York State Attorney 
General Eliot Spitzer intervened on behalf of the Center to protect 
the interests of the citizens of New York in the assets of this New 
York state nonprofit corporation.116 
The bench trial held in April 2002 before Judge Miriam 
Goldman Cedarbaum of the District Court for the Southern District 
of New York was “an effort to recapture a history that partially 
predated the knowledge and memory of the living witnesses.”117  
The specific circumstances of each work further complicated the 
district court’s analysis.  Some works were governed by the 
Copyright Act of 1909 (“1909 Act”), others by the 1976 Act; some 
were created before the Center was established, others after; some 
had been published, others had not.118  Additionally, the critical 
 
 114 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 630–31. 
 115 See id. at 631.  The Center also counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, 
and negligent misrepresentation by Protas and for replevin of items possessed and money 
improperly borrowed by Protas. See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 570.  The Center 
sought “a constructive trust to recover the proceeds of [Protas’s] licensing of the ballets, 
sets, and costumes to third parties and of his sale of defendants’ property to the Library of 
Congress [and] disgorgement of ten years of Protas’ salary and of payments made to 
Protas by defendants under [the] 1999 license agreement.” Id. 
 116 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 631 (stating that the Center’s position was supported by 
Attorney General Spitzer); Paul Ben-Itzak, Who Owns Martha Graham?  Protas Gets His 
Close Up, and Dancers Get Their Day in Court, DANCE INSIDER (Mar. 24, 2001) (“[T]he 
citizens of New York have an interest and investment in the outcome of the case.”), at 
http://www.danceinsider.com/f2001/f324.html.  Attorney General Spitzer’s office had 
previously tried to mediate the dispute. See Doreen Carvajal, A State Grant Could Help 
Save Graham Studio, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2000, at E1. 
 117 Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 570–71. 
 118 “The copyright claims in this case have to be assessed through the prism of the 
changes in the copyright law that took effect in 1978, 1989, and 1992.  The chronology of 
creation, publication, and copyright registration and renewal of the choreography of each 
dance is critical to a determination of copyright ownership.” Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d 
at 582–83 (citations omitted).  For a complete overview of the issues presented by this 
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events of this litigation spanned sixty-five years and “many of the 
pertinent facts [were] obscured by inadequate record keeping.”119  
Also informing the district court’s decision was the fact that, “after 
listening to his evasive and inconsistent testimony and observing 
his demeanor, [Judge Cedarbaum found] Protas not to be a credible 
witness.”120 
The district court overwhelmingly found in favor of the Center, 
holding that forty-five dances were owned by the Center.121  
Thirty-four dances created by Graham while she was employed by 
the School or the Center between 1956 and 1991 were found to 
have been works for hire.122  The district court found that the 
Center held the copyrights to only twenty-seven of these thirty-
four dances because seven dances had been published without 
sufficient evidence as to whether there was copyright notice.123  
The district court also found that Graham had assigned a total of 
twenty-one of her earlier unpublished works to the Center.124  
Although there was no evidence of a written assignment by 
Graham, the district court held that “a preponderance of the 
credible evidence” established the transfer of the common law 
copyright in these unpublished works.125  This evidence included 
letters, documents, contracts with third parties, minutes of the 
Center’s board of directors meetings, financial records, and witness 
 
case, see David Goldberg & Robert J. Bernstein, Shall We Dance?: Choreographic 
Works and ‘Martha Graham,’ 228 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2002). 
 119 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 629. 
 120 Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 572.  Although the trial was not officially about who 
deserved to own the works, the plaintiff’s “erratic, ingratiating, spiteful, dissembling, un-
mindful, vindictive, simpering and quite possibly demented personality [was] also on 
trial.” Paul Ben-Itzak, If Protas is Defeated, Would Dancers Win the Battle but Lose the 
War?, DANCE INSIDER (Apr. 26, 2002), at http://www.danceinsider.com/f2002/f04-
26_1.html. 
 121 See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 612.  The district court’s ruling as to each dance 
is detailed in the Appendix to the Second Circuit’s decision. Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 
647–48. 
 122 See id. at 592. 
 123 See id. at 594. 
 124 See id. at 597. 
 125 Id. at 596–97.  “[T]he transfer of the ‘common law copyright’ in unpublished works 
did not have to be in writing but could be oral or inferred from conduct.” Id. at 596 
(quoting Jerry Vogel Music Co. v. Warner Bros., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 172, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982)). 
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testimony showing that the Center consistently acted as the owner 
of these dances and that Graham did not object.126  Eighteen of the 
twenty-one assigned works were held to presently belong to the 
Center.127  The district court held that neither party had established 
ownership of twenty-four dances, ten of which had entered the 
public domain for lack of timely renewal, five of which were 
commissioned works, and nine of which were published but for 
which neither side had proven whether they had been published 
with adequate notice of copyright.128  Protas established ownership 
of one dance.129  As executor of Graham’s estate he was entitled to 
the renewal term in one dance originally assigned to the Center and 
subsequently published with notice of copyright in 1969.130 
The appeal was argued before the Second Circuit on January 
29, 2004.131  The Second Circuit largely upheld the district court’s 
work-for-hire ruling, disagreeing primarily in the application of the 
work-for-hire doctrine to ten works choreographed by Graham 
between 1956 and 1965 while she was a part-time employee of the 
School.132  The Second Circuit also disagreed with the district 
court’s determination that two works were unpublished.133  The 
case was remanded to the district court for a determination of 
ownership of seven of the ten dances created between 1956 
 
 126 See id. at 598–600. 
 127 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 631; Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 612.  Present 
ownership of two of the twenty-one assigned works was not established because they 
were subsequently published and neither party established whether they had been 
published with adequate notice of copyright. See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 613.  
Protas was found to own the one remaining assigned work. See infra notes 129–30 and 
accompanying text. 
 128 See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 612–13.  Both parties requested that the Second 
Circuit clarify whether the fourteen works for which ownership remained unproven (the 
five commissioned works and the nine lacking evidence of adequate statutory notice) 
were in the public domain or whether there remained a possibility of proving ownership. 
See Brief for Plaintiff-Counter-Claimant-Appellant Martha Graham School & Dance 
Found. at 64–66, Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624 (No. 02-9451(L)); Brief for Defendants-
Counter-Claimants-Appellees at 67, Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624 (No. 02-9451(L)).  The 
Second Circuit, however, simply affirmed the district court’s ruling that neither party had 
established ownership of these dances. See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 637 n.25, 647–48. 
 129 See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 613. 
 130 See id. at 602. 
 131 Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 624. 
 132 See id. at 628, 637–39, 647; discussion infra notes 158–61. 
 133 See id. at 637, 640, 642. 
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through 1965 and the two dances that were incorrectly held to be 
unpublished.134  A remand hearing has been scheduled for May 
2005.135 
A petition for a writ of certiorari was filed by Protas on March 
21, 2005, challenging the Second Circuit’s work-for-hire holdings 
and questioning “[w]hether the work-for-hire doctrine can divest 
an artist from the ownership of her body of work in situations 
where that artist has established a not-for-profit entity to facilitate 
the creation and presentation of those same works.”136  Both the 
Center and Intervener Eliot Spitzer have waived their right to 
respond to the petition.137  As this Note went to press, the Supreme 
Court had not yet ruled on the certiorari petition. 
II. LEGALITIES OF CONTROL: WORKS FOR HIRE, NONPROFITS, AND 
MORAL RIGHTS 
A. The Right to Control and the Work-for-Hire Doctrine 
Congress has not fully defined the term “author” as used in the 
Copyright Act, although both the 1909 and 1976 Acts state that an 
employer is considered the “author” in the case of works made for 
hire.138  “[W]ith respect to works for hire, the employer is legally 
 
 134 See id. at 647; see also discussion infra notes 162–65.  The district court also was 
instructed to recalculate the amount of Protas’ proceeds from the licensing of the works 
determined to belong to the Center, that the Center is entitled to recover in light of its 
findings on remand in determining ownership of these nine dances. See id. at 646–47; see 
also supra note 115. 
 135 Petition of Writ of Certiorari, 2005 WL 682101 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-1277) 
(appeal from Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
 136 Id.  The second question presented for review was “[w]hether the conflict between 
the . . . Second and Ninth Circuits with respect to scope of the work-for-hire doctrine as 
applied to copyrights of creative works should be resolved in favor of Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation?” Id. 
 137 Docket for No. 04-1277, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-1277.htm 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2005).  Attorney General Spitzer’s waiver of right to respond was 
filed on March 31, 2005; the Center’s waiver was filed on April 6, 2005. Id. 
 138 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) (“In the case of a work made 
for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the 
author for purposes of this title . . . .”); Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1909) 
(current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994)) (“[In] the interpretation and construction of 
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regarded as the ‘author,’ as distinguished from the creator of the 
work, whom Learned Hand referred to as ‘the “author” in the 
colloquial sense.’”139  The Supreme Court has defined “author” in 
this sense to be “[h]e to whom anything owes its origin; originator, 
maker.”140 
Under both the 1909 and 1976 Acts, the work-for-hire doctrine 
embraces the tenet that in a typical employer-employee 
relationship, the employer has some right of control over the 
creation of a work by an employee.141  Although “no one sells or 
mortgages all the products of his brain to his employer by the mere 
fact of employment,”142 the Center’s right to control Graham’s 
work, as her employer, was a factor in determining that the work-
for-hire doctrine applied.143  As the Second Circuit highlighted in 
its opinion, so long as the employer has the right to supervise the 
manner in which a work is created, the fact that the employer did 
 
this title . . . the word ‘author’ shall include an employer in the case of works made for 
hire.”). 
 139 Graham IV, 380 F.3d at. at 634 (quoting Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 123 
F.2d 697, 699 (2d Cir. 1941)). 
 140 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884); see also Goldstein 
v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (holding that the term “author” is not to be 
construed in its “narrow literal sense, but, rather, with the reach necessary to reflect the 
broad scope of constitutional principles”).  Because the Center financially enabled the 
creation of Graham’s works, the works at least partially “owed their origin” to the Center. 
Compare Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58, with Nottage v. Jackson, 11 Q.B. 627 (1883) 
(quoted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 60–61) (stating that an 
author “is the person who effectively is as near as he can be, the cause of the picture 
which is produced . . . the person who has superintended the arrangement, who has 
actually formed the picture by putting persons in position and arranging the place where 
the people are to be.”). 
 141 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989) 
(establishing that, for works created under the 1976 Act, the extent of the employer’s 
control is a factor to be considered in determining whether a party is an employee under 
the common law of agency); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 
1995) (quoting Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972)) 
(holding that in applying the “instance and expense” test to works created under the 1909 
Act, “an essential element of the employer-employee relationship, [is] the right of the 
employer to direct and supervise the manner in which the writer performs his work”). 
 142 Pub. Affairs Assocs. v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 601, 604 (D.D.C. 1959), rev’d on 
other grounds, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated for insufficient record, 369 U.S. 
111 (1962). 
 143 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 633–42. 
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not exercise control does not preclude application of the work-for-
hire doctrine.144 
1. Works for Hire under the 1909 Act 
a) The “Instance and Expense” Test 
An employer-employee relationship signifying work-for-hire 
status for works created under the 1909 Act is determined through 
application of the “instance and expense” test, first utilized by the 
Second Circuit in Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill 
Publishing Co.,145 which held that when an employee’s work was 
created at the employer’s instance and expense and the intent of 
the parties could not be determined, the presumption of copyright 
ownership ran in favor of the employer.146  These principles were 
found to apply to both the traditional employer-employee 
relationship as well as in the relationship of employer and 
independent contractor.147  The Second Circuit has since defined 
the “instance and expense” test as being met when the employer 
both induced the creation of the work and had the right to direct 
and supervise how the work was executed.148  Significantly, “[t]he 
 
 144 See id. at 635 (citing Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 500–01 (2d Cir. 
1969)), 642 (citing Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 85–88 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 145 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 146 See id. at 567–68 (2d Cir. 1966); see also Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 588 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d in part, 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Brattleboro, 369 F.2d 
at 568).  The Second Circuit traced the use of the phrase “instance and expense” in 
copyright jurisprudence back to the 1887 case of Hanson v. Jaccard Jewelry Co., 32 F. 
202, 202 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1887). See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 635 n.17.  “[T]he phrase was 
first used in an operative sense in a provision of a [1905] draft bill prepared by . . . 
Thorvald Solberg, then the Register of Copyrights,” that would have offered protection 
for a “composite or collective work . . . produced at the instance and expense of a 
publisher.” Id. (citation omitted).  The next use of the phrase was found in the 1964 
edition of Nimmer on Copyright. See id.  The phrase first appeared in a reported opinion 
in 1965: Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1965). See 
id. 
 147 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 635 (citing Brattleboro, 369 F.2d at 568). 
 148 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Siegel v. 
Nat’l Periodical Publ’ns, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1974); Picture Music, Inc. v. 
Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972)). 
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right to direct and supervise the manner in which work is created 
need never be exercised.”149 
b) The “Instance and Expense” Test as Applied to 
Graham’s Works (1956–1977) 
i. District Court 
In holding that nineteen dances choreographed by Graham 
from 1956 through 1977 were works for hire, the district court 
found the “expense” test to be satisfied because Graham 
choreographed on dancers employed by the Center; thus, the tools 
used to create Graham’s choreographic works were provided by 
the Center.150  Graham herself had recognized that “[she] could 
never have done what [she did] if [she] had not had such a 
place.”151  While acknowledging that it was “undisputed that 
Martha Graham was ultimately responsible for making all final 
artistic decisions relating to the dances,”152 the court found the 
“instance” test to be satisfied as well, holding that the fact that “the 
Center’s board of directors did not interfere with Graham’s artistic 
decisions does not show that it did not have the legal authority, as 
her employer, to ensure that dances were created at the ‘instance’ 
of the defendants.”153 
ii. Second Circuit 
On appeal, Protas contended that Graham was not an employee 
within the scope of the 1909 Act since “she choreographed at no 
one’s instance but her own.”154  The Second Circuit found, 
however, that whether Graham would have choreographed without 
her salary and the support of the Center was irrelevant, and that 
Protas attempted to give the word “instance” a “more 
particularized meaning” than appropriate for the instance and 
expense test, which does not require that the employer be the 
 
 149 Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 635 (citing Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 
500–01 (2d Cir. 1969)). 
 150 See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 589–90 (“The creation of the dances was a 
collaborative process in which the Center’s employees played an indispensable role.”). 
 151 Id. at 589. 
 152 Id. at 590. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
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“precipitating force” behind each work created by an employee.155  
“Many talented people . . . are expected by their employers to 
produce the sort of work for which they were hired, without any 
need for the employer to suggest any particular product.  ‘Instance’ 
is not a term of exclusion as applied to specific works created 
within the scope of regular employment.”156  The fact that Graham 
was paid by the Center specifically to create the intellectual 
property at issue in this litigation was significant in finding that a 
work-for-hire relationship existed.157 
Despite the Second Circuit’s agreement with the district court’s 
application of the instance and expense test, it concluded that the 
district court erred in finding ten works choreographed by Graham 
from 1956 through 1965 to be works for hire.158  Per Graham’s 
employment contract, she was employed by the School during that 
period only to teach and supervise the School’s education program 
as part-time Program Director, despite the fact that part of the 
School’s purpose was the creation of dances.159  There was no 
evidence that her duties included choreography, while there was 
evidence that during this period Graham received income from 
 
 155 See id. at 640. But see Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of 
Self-Realization, 206 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that writings by a monk 
who founded his own religious order were “motivated by [his] own desire for self-
expression or religious instruction of the public” and therefore did not qualify as works 
for hire under the 1909 Act).  The Second Circuit distinguished the employee in Self-
Realization Fellowship Church from Graham in that Swami Paramahansa Yogananda had 
much less of a connection to his putative employer church than would an employee in a 
traditional employment relationship. Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624, 640 (2d Cir. 2004), 
petition for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-1277).  
Additionally, while Graham’s choreography was clearly part of the regular business of 
the Center, see infra note 190 and accompanying text, the Swami’s writings were not 
necessarily part of the regular business of the Self-Realization Fellowship Church. Cf. 
Aims & Ideals of Self-Realization Fellowship (listing the aims and ideals of the Church 
as set forth by founder Paramahansa Yogananda), at http://www.yogananda.com-
/aboutsrf/aims_ideals.html (last updated Sept. 12, 2000).  Although the Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion did not define the regular business of the Church, whether the “employee created 
the work as part of the regular course of business of the employer” was mentioned as a 
consideration in establishing a work-for-hire relationship. See Self-Realization 
Fellowship Church, 206 F.3d at 1326–27 (citation omitted). 
 156 Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 640–41. 
 157 See id. at 640. 
 158 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 637. 
 159 See id. at 637–38. 
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other sources for her choreography.160  Although the resources 
provided by the Center, including rehearsal space and dancers, 
may have aided Graham in her choreography—arguably satisfying 
the “expense” test—“no dances were proved to have been created 
before 1966 at the ‘instance’ of the Center.”161 
The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling with 
respect to seven unpublished works created during this 
timeframe.162  The question of the ownership of these dances was 
remanded to the district court to determine if Graham had assigned 
any of these dances to the Center or whether the works had passed 
to Protas as part of Graham’s estate.163  As to the remaining three 
works created from 1956 through 1965, which the Second Circuit 
determined not to be works for hire, the Second Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s holding that two of these works belonged to 
neither the Center nor Protas because it had not been sufficiently 
proven that the works had been published with the required 
statutory notice of copyright.164  The Second Circuit reversed the 
district court’s holding with respect to the third work, determined 
to have been published with copyright notice, because even if 
Graham has assigned the renewal term for that work to the Center, 
her death prior to the beginning of the renewal term would have 
voided such assignment; therefore, this work had passed to Protas 
as Graham’s beneficiary.165 
The Second Circuit upheld the district court’s work-for-hire 
finding with respect to the nine works created from 1966 through 
1977, finding that Graham had signed a new ten-year contract with 
the Center in 1966 that changed her status to full-time Artistic 
Director of the Center.166  After this contract was signed, Graham’s 
“primary duty was to choreograph new dances.”167  This contract 
 
 160 See id. 
 161 Id. at 638. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. at 638–39; see also supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 164 See id. at 638. 
 165 See id. at 645. 
 166 See id. at 639. 
 167 See id. at 640. 
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was renewed indefinitely in 1976 and remained in effect until 
Graham’s death in 1991.168 
2. Works for Hire under the 1976 Act 
a) “Employee” Status under the Common Law of Agency 
Under the 1976 Act, there is a presumption of ownership by the 
employer, unless contracted otherwise in writing.169  To ascertain 
whether a work created on or after January 1, 1978, is a work for 
hire, the determinative question is whether it was “prepared by an 
employee within the scope of his or her employment.”170  
Definitions for “employee” and “scope of employment” are 
lacking under the 1976 Act,171 but the Supreme Court has held that 
“the term ‘employee’ should be understood in light of the general 
common law of agency.”172  Work is within an employee’s “scope 
of employment” if (1) it is of the kind the employee was hired to 
perform, (2) its creation occurs substantially within the authorized 
time and space limits of the job, and (3) it was at least partially 
motivated by a desire to serve the employer. 173 
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,174 the 
Supreme Court listed twelve factors to consider in determining 
whether a party is an employee under the common law of agency: 
(1) the right to control the manner and means of production, (2) the 
necessary skill, (3) the source of the instrumentalities and tools, (4) 
the location of the work, (5) the duration of the relationship, (6) the 
right to assign additional projects, (7) control over when and how 
 
 168 See id. at 639. 
 169 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000).  This section provides: 
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the 
work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and unless 
the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by 
them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 170 Id. § 101; Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-553, § 102, 90 Stat. 2541, 2598 (1976). 
 171 See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 172 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989). 
 173 See Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958)). 
 174 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
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long to work, (8) the method of payment, (9) the choice and 
compensation of assistants, (10) the regular business of the hiring 
party, (11) employee benefits provided, and (12) tax treatment.175  
“No one of these factors is determinative.”176  The Reid Court 
“held that ‘employee’ should not be interpreted exclusively in 
terms of whether the hiring party retains the right to control the 
product, nor in terms of whether the hiring party has actually 
wielded control over the creation of the work.”177 
In Aymes v. Bonelli,178 the Second Circuit subsequently 
narrowed the list to five factors that “will be significant in virtually 
every situation . . . and should be given more weight in the 
analysis:” (1) requisite skill, (2) the right of the hiring party to 
control the manner and means of production, (3) whether the hired 
party may be assigned additional projects, (4) tax treatment of the 
hired party, and (5) provision of employee benefits.179 
b) Agency Factors as Applied to Graham’s Works (1978–
1991) 
i. District Court 
The status of fifteen of Graham’s works, choreographed from 
1978 through 1991, was assessed under the 1976 Act.180  A 
balancing of the Aymes factors by the district court showed that 
Graham was an employee of the Center.181  Although Graham’s 
level of skill was uncontested, the court found that the board 
exercised its control “in all the ways it saw fit while giving 
deference to Graham’s talent as a choreographer.”182  The board 
 
 175 See id. at 751–52 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958)). 
 176 Id. at 752. 
 177 Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d in part, 380 F.3d 624 
(2d Cir. 2004) (citing Reid, 490 U.S. at 742–43). 
 178 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 179 Id. at 861. 
 180 See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 587, 590–92. 
 181 See id. at 591. 
 182 Id. at 592 (“Graham reported regularly to the board on her new works, and the board 
set the financial bounds within which she could work.”).  The Second Circuit has held 
that a sculpture created by artists who “had complete artistic freedom with respect to 
every aspect of the sculpture’s creation,” was a work made for hire. See Carter v. 
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 86–87 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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also “encouraged her to produce new work, and occasionally 
suggested themes for new dances.”183  Graham received a salary 
from the Center as Artistic Director, from which taxes were 
withheld, and the Center paid personal, travel, and medical 
expenses and other employee benefits on her behalf.184 
The court also applied additional factors from Reid which 
further supported its determination of Graham’s employee 
status.185  The Center was the “source of [Graham’s] 
instrumentalities and tools,” as it paid for the dancers, pianists, 
sets, and costumes and provided the rehearsal space.186  The 
“location of the work” was the defendants’ premises.187  The 
“duration of the relationship” was more than three decades of 
employment.188  The “method of payment” was a fixed annual 
salary, set by the board of directors, “with no separate 
compensation for the creation of dances.”189  And the creation of 
dances by Martha Graham was part of the “regular business” of the 
Center.190  These factors pointed “overwhelmingly to the 
conclusion that Graham was an employee of the defendants.”191 
 
 
 
 183 Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 592. 
 184 See id. at 573.  Graham’s salary was described as “‘several hundred a week’ when 
there was money.” Dunning, Hearings Start, supra note 4 (quoting Cynthia Parker 
Kaback, general manager of the Center from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s). 
 185 See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 592; see also supra text accompanying supra 
note 175. 
 186 Id. (citing Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989)). 
 187 See id. 
 188 See id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id.  Interestingly enough, in considering when a work that was “specially ordered or 
commissioned” (as opposed to created by an employee within the scope of his 
employment) is entitled to work–for-hire status under 17 U.S.C. § 101(2), the Register of 
Copyrights has stated that visual artists and photographers were “among the most 
vulnerable and poorly protected of all the beneficiaries of the copyright law, and it seems 
clear that, like serious composers and choreographers, [these artists] were not intended to 
be treated as ‘employees’ under the carefully negotiated definition in section 101.” Reid, 
490 U.S. at 747 n.13 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECOND 
SUPPLEMENTARY REP. OF THE REG. OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GEN. REVISION OF U.S. 
COPYRIGHT LAW ch. XI, at 12–13 (1975)). 
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ii. Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion 
that Graham’s dances created from 1978 through 1991 were works 
for hire.192  Conceding that the Center did not exercise much 
control over Graham, the Second Circuit focused on the fact that 
“the absence of a hiring party’s exercise of control does not mean 
that an artist is not an employee where other factors weigh in favor 
of finding an employment relationship.”193  Thus, while 
recognition of Graham’s artistic genius would explain the Center’s 
disinclination to exercise control over her choreography, such 
uncontested artistic skill would not preclude a finding of an 
employment relationship for purposes of the work-for-hire 
doctrine.194 
B. The Significance of Control within Nonprofit Organizations 
An additional prism through which to interpret the Graham 
case is the nonprofit structure of the Center.  Moving beyond the 
legal issue of Graham’s “employee” status, she was undisputedly 
the founder and artistic director of the nonprofit Center, a member 
of its board of directors, and, in practice if not legally, the person 
with primary control over the organization.195  Graham’s 
leadership role was significant because her control over the Center 
could have potentially raised fiduciary duty and private inurement 
issues in connection with the ownership and use of her works 
during her lifetime.  Although not raised in the Graham case, these 
considerations could strengthen the equitable rationale for allowing 
ownership to vest in the Center. 
 
 192 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624, 641 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73 
U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-1277). 
 193 Id. at 642 (citing Carter v. Helmsley Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 85–88 (2d Cir. 1995)) 
(emphasis added). 
 194 See id.  “The Restatement offers the example of a ‘full-time cook’ over whose 
culinary activity ‘it is understood that the employer will exercise no control.’” Id. (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) cmt. d (1958)). 
 195 See supra notes 67–68; Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d 512, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 
43 Fed. Appx. 408 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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1. Fiduciary Duty 
New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law requires that 
nonprofit directors and officers “discharge [their] duties . . . in 
good faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which 
ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances 
in like positions.”196  The district court found that by virtue of his 
role as a board member and as principal managerial employee of 
the Center, “Protas had a fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty to the 
Center and the School.”197  The Second Circuit affirmed that he 
violated this duty and profited improperly at the Center’s expense 
when he failed to investigate what he owned under Graham’s will 
(as he had been advised to do by his attorney) and represented to 
the other board members that he owned Graham’s dances.198  In 
doing so, he “failed to exercise the ‘degree of diligence, care and 
skill’ required of directors and officers of not-for-profit 
corporations.”199 
The board of the Center had a comparable fiduciary duty to 
uphold the mission of the organization by protecting and 
preserving Graham’s work.200  This duty provided a strong 
motivation for the Center’s position in the Graham case; the board 
could not allow Protas to endanger the existence of the Center by 
removing Graham’s works from the Company’s repertoire. 
 
 196 N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 717(a) (McKinney 1997 & Supp. 2005). 
 197 Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d 512, 521–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 43 Fed. Appx. 408 
(2d Cir. 2002) (citing Aramony v. United Way of Am., No. 96 Civ. 3962, 1998 WL 
205331, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 1998) (“As chief executive officer of UWA, Aramony 
owed the organization and its members a fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty.”)).  Protas’s 
position as Artistic Director of the Center “carried with it an implied promise to act in the 
Center’s best interest.” Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 646. 
 198 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 630; Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002); Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 516. 
 199 Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 609.  “These assertions were, at best, irresponsibly 
made, and, at worst, intentionally misleading.” Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 646. 
 200 See BJORKLUND ET AL., supra note 62, § 11-4(a) (“One of a director’s basic 
responsibilities is to ensure that the mission of the organization . . . is carried out.”).  “It is 
firmly established that the directors of a corporation have the fiduciary obligation to act 
on behalf of the corporation in good faith and with reasonable care so as to protect and 
advance its interests.” Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 608 (citing Pebble Cove 
Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Shoratlantic Dev. Co., 595 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (App. Div. 1992)). 
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Martha Graham—as founder, artistic director, and member of 
the board—was bound by a similar duty to the Center.  This duty 
required her to place the interests of the Center above her own.201  
Since the Center was founded to promote and disseminate 
Graham’s work,202 Graham and the Center shared a common 
purpose.  By furthering her own artistic interests, Graham was also 
furthering the interests of the Center.203  Had she made an attempt 
to personally profit from works created with Center resources at 
the expense of the Center, however, a duty of loyalty question 
might have been raised.204  Simply owning the copyright in her 
works should not have called this duty into question, but private 
economic exploitation of the rights secured by copyright, to the 
detriment of the Center, might have raised a question of whether 
the assets of the Center had been “distributed” to Graham in 
violation of the nondistribution constraint.205  During Graham’s 
lifetime, her ability to exploit her rights in her choreography may 
have been limited by her leadership role within the Center. 
 
 201 See Aramony, 1998 WL 205331, at *7; see also S.H. & Helen R. Scheuer Family 
Found., Inc. v. 61 Assocs., 582 N.Y.S.2d 662, 665 (App. Div. 1992) (citation omitted) 
(“[I]t is well established that, as fiduciaries, board members bear a duty of loyalty to the 
corporation and ‘may not profit improperly at the expense of the corporation.’”). 
 202 See Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 525. 
 203 C.f. id. at 526. 
 204 A contract or transaction between a nonprofit organization and one of it its directors 
or officers is allowed if the director’s or officer’s interest in the transaction is disclosed or 
known to the board, and the other board members authorize the transaction with such 
knowledge. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715(a) (McKinney 1997 & Supp. 
2005).  Without disclosure of the director’s interest, such a transaction may still be 
considered valid so long as it was fair and reasonable to the nonprofit organization at the 
time of the transaction. See id § 715(b).  Practically speaking, the board of the Center 
would have been well aware of Graham’s interest in any transaction involving her work, 
and this knowledge would have validated such a transaction.  So long as the board had 
authorized such an arrangement, the “fair and reasonable” question would never have 
been raised.  Thus, a duty of loyalty question would have been relevant only if Graham 
had personally utilized her works without the board’s knowledge and consent. 
 205 See id. § 508 (providing that all “profits shall be applied to the maintenance, 
expansion or operation of the lawful activities of the corporation, and in no case shall be 
divided or distributed in any manner whatsoever among the members, directors, or 
officers of the corporation”); see also supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
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2. Private Inurement 
On the federal level, to qualify for tax exemption under § 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, “no part of the net 
earnings [may] inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual.”206  To allow “private inurement” would indicate that 
the organization was operated for a private, rather than public, 
purpose.207  The Treasury Department regulations define 
prohibited private interests as those of “the creator or his family, 
shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by such private interests.”208  As the founder of the 
Center, Graham would have qualified under this definition as a 
“private shareholder or individual.”209 
The Internal Revenue Service has denied or revoked tax 
exemption from nonprofit organizations found to serve the private 
interests of artists who were founders or directors of the 
organizations, including “an organization whose primary purpose 
[was] to promote the circulation of books [written by] one of its 
incorporators;”210 “a cooperative art gallery formed and operated 
by a group of artists for the purposes of exhibiting and selling their 
work;”211 and a foundation, the resources of which were used for 
the benefit of a board member who was a well-known textile artist 
and wife of the foundation’s president.212  “The heart of § 
501(c)(3) tax exempt status is the phrase ‘inures to the benefit.’ . . . 
Unaccounted for diversions of a charitable organization’s 
 
 206 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). 
 207 See id. 
 208 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2004) (emphasis added). 
 209 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-1(c) (“The words private shareholder or individual in 
section 501 refer to persons having a personal and private interest in the activities of the 
organization.”). 
 210 See Rev. Rul. 55-231, 1955-1 C.B. 72 (holding that an organization was not 
organized and operated exclusively for educational purposes where its primary activity 
was the purchase and distribution of an incorporator’s books). 
 211 See Rev. Rul. 71-395, 1971-2 C.B. 228 (holding that a gallery served only the private 
purposes of its members, and therefore was not exempt under § 501(c)(3), where it was a 
vehicle for advancing the careers of its members and promoting the sale of their work). 
 212 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-08-006 (Dec. 4, 1992) (holding that the foundation’s 
earnings inured to the textile artist/board member where the foundation promoted the 
board member’s art work and career). 
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resources by one who has complete and unfettered control can 
constitute inurement.”213 
Intellectual property rights in choreography are a resource for a 
dance company, although one for which the value is speculative 
and contingent on access to other resources.214  As a party with a 
prohibited private interest under the Treasury Regulations,215 
Graham’s retention of copyright could have raised a question of 
private inurement. 
C. Artistic Control and Moral Rights 
Another issue not arising in the Graham case but essential to 
interpreting the significance of the ruling concerns “rights” of 
artistic control, which may be viewed as analogous to moral 
rights—personal rights of the author recognized as independent 
from the economic rights of copyright.216  Although the U.S. 
Copyright Act does not acknowledge such moral rights in either 
works of choreography or works for hire, nor does the Act 
recognize the existence of any moral rights after an artist’s 
death,217 the relationship of moral rights to artistic control as 
recognized within the dance field is noteworthy. 
 
 213 Church of Scientology v. Comm’r, 823 F.2d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming a 
tax court decision which upheld the Commissioner’s revocation of tax exemption from 
the Church of Scientology of California, the “Mother Church” of the many Scientology 
churches, because significant sums of money had inured to the benefit of the church’s 
founder, L. Ron Hubbard, and his family). But cf. Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. 
Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 206 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that common 
law copyrights to works of a Swami monk who was founder, president, and a director of 
Self-Realization Fellowship Church did not vest in the church as a matter of law).  
Following authorization of the IRS intermediate sanctions in 1996, a transaction 
providing an “excess benefit” to a person in a position to exercise substantial influence 
over the nonprofit organization may result in taxes on such person and on the nonprofit 
director or officer allowing the transaction, rather than resulting in an immediate 
revocation of tax exempt status. See 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (2000). 
 214 See discussion supra Part I.C.2. 
 215 See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text. 
 216 See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.01[A] 
(2003) (citing WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO THE BERNE 
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (Paris Act, 1971) 
41 (1978); H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6928 (1990)). 
 217 See infra note 235 and accompanying text. 
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1. Moral Rights Defined 
Moral rights are rights of a “spiritual, non-economic, and 
personal nature,”218 which are based on the theory that an original 
creation reflects the personality of its creator.219  These rights 
“result in a climate of artistic worth and honor that encourages the 
author in the arduous act of creation.”220  In countries that 
recognize such rights, even a full transfer of copyright for 
economic purposes does not serve to divest an author of his moral 
rights.221  European courts, however, have allowed these 
“inalienable” rights to be waived or modified by contract.222 
Moral rights are commonly believed to have originated in 
France and developed in civil law jurisdictions.223  Specific moral 
rights are defined by the national laws protecting their existence, 
but such rights are generally of two types: rights of paternity (also 
known as rights of attribution) and rights of integrity,224 which are 
mandated by Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, which states: 
(1) Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even 
after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the 
right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any 
 
 218 Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 219 See WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (Paris 
Act, 1971) 41 (1978). 
 220 Carter, 71 F.3d at 83 (citation omitted). 
 221 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, 
Sept. 9, 1886, revised July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention], 
available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo001en.htm.  Under French law, 
moral rights attach to the author rather than to the work itself, “and, therefore remain 
vested in the artist even after the work is transferred.” 2 RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH 
BRESLER, ART LAW 947 (2d ed. 1998) (citing Registrar of Copyrights Final Report, 
Waiver of Moral Rights in Visual Artworks 39 (1996)). 
 222 See Singer, supra note 72, at 317 n.141 (citing William Strauss, The Moral Right of 
the Author, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 506, 516–17 (1955)).  The Berne Convention “disregards 
the principle of assignability and does not prohibit waivability.” LERNER & BRESLER, 
supra note 221, at 948 (citing Registrar of Copyrights Final Report, Waiver of Moral 
Rights in Visual Artworks 52 (1996)). 
 223 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 221, at 944.  The term “moral rights” is literally 
a translation of the French le droit moral. See Carter, 71 F.3d at 81. 
 224 See Carter, 71 F.3d at 81.  Rights of paternity and integrity are protected by most of 
the legal systems which currently acknowledge moral rights. See LERNER & BRESLER, 
supra note 221, at 946. 
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distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other 
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would 
be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.225 
Basic paternity rights under French law include the artist’s 
rights to be publicly recognized as the creator of his work or to 
publish anonymously or pseudonymously, to prevent another from 
claiming authorship of his work, and to prevent his name from 
being used in connection with the work of another or in connection 
with an altered or distorted version of his own work.226  The 
paternity right has been said to encompass an artist’s right “to have 
his work attributed to him in the form in which he created it.”227  
Enduring choreographic credit each time a dance is performed is 
an example of a paternity right.228  Integrity rights allow an author 
to prohibit or control alterations of his works.229  With 
choreography, an integrity right is acknowledged in that those 
performing the work are not allowed to make unauthorized 
changes, but the choreographer retains the right to revise the work 
“whenever aesthetic or practical reasons dictate.”230  In some 
jurisdictions, the integrity right also allows an author to protect his 
work from destruction.231 
In addition, some European countries recognize a withdrawal 
right which allows an artist to withdraw the work from the public 
or to make modifications.232  This right may be exercised even if 
exploitation rights have been transferred, “so long as the artist 
indemnifies the transferee before exercising the right.”233 
 
 225 Berne Convention, supra note 221, art. 6bis; see also LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 
221, at 947. 
 226 See Carter, 71 F.3d at 81; LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 221, at 946. 
 227 Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 228 See Singer, supra note 72, at 292–93. 
 229 See Carter, 71 F.3d at 81; LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 221, at 947. 
 230 Singer, supra note 72, at 310. 
 231 See Carter, 71 F.3d at 81–82.  Protection against destruction is not expressly 
mentioned in the Berne Convention, but such a right is recognized in the United States. 
See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 221, at 947 (citing Edward J. Damich, The Visual 
Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of Moral Rights Protection for 
Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 963 (1990)). 
 232 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 221, at 945. 
 233 Id.  This right is rarely invoked. See id. at 946 (“[F]ew French cases have even 
addressed the right.”). 
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2. Limited U.S. Recognition of Moral Rights 
American copyright law seeks primarily to vindicate the 
economic rights of artists.234  The only moral rights currently 
acknowledged by the 1976 Act are limited rights of attribution and 
integrity, which are provided only to authors of works of visual 
art.235  The Second Circuit has recognized, however, that “the 
economic incentive for artistic and intellectual creation that serves 
as the foundation for American copyright law cannot be reconciled 
with the inability of artists to obtain relief for mutilation or 
misrepresentation of their work to the public on which the artists 
are financially dependent.”236 
Even though Congress has yet to acknowledge full moral rights 
for all genres of work, some federal and state courts have 
recognized these rights as “necessary and proper adjuncts to the 
creative process.”237  Courts have provided sporadic relief for 
infringements of paternity and integrity rights by “cloaking the 
concept in the guise of other legal theories,”238 such as invasion of 
privacy,239 unfair competition,240 false designation of origin under 
 
 234 See Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976).  According to the Supreme 
Court, “the economic philosophy behind the clause” is “the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare through the talents of authors . . . .” Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
 235 See Visual Artist Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”), 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2004).  These 
rights are limited to the life of the author, and they may not be transferred to another 
party, although they may be waived via a signed writing. See id. § 106A(d)–(e).  Works 
of visual art include paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and photographs. See id. § 
101.  Works for hire are excluded from the definition of a “work of visual art.” See 
generally id.  Thus, neither works for hire nor works of choreography are eligible for any 
moral rights protection under the 1976 Act. 
 236 Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24 (internal citations omitted). 
 237 Singer, supra note 72, at 311. 
 238 Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1995).  Per § 301(b)(3) of the 
1976 Act, state court remedies that are not equivalent to those secured by the Act are not 
preempted. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(b); Singer, supra note 72, at 311 n.111.  “[F]ederal pre-
emption is generally inapplicable to state laws of unfair competition of the passing off 
variety, defamation, invasion of privacy, and contracts.” NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 
216, § 8D.02(B).  While the specific provisions of VARA preempt some state laws with 
respect to moral rights in works of visual art, it is likely that state laws are not preempted 
with respect to moral rights in other categories of work. Id. 
 239 See Singer, supra note 72, at 313 (citing Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 127 P.2d 577, 
579–81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942) (finding that an improper attribution adversely affected an 
artist’s good reputation and, therefore, constituted an invasion of privacy)). 
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the Lanham Act,241 breach of contract,242 and defamation.243  These 
decisions “vindicate the author’s personal right to prevent the 
presentation of his work to the public in a distorted form,” even 
though the holdings have been based on proprietary rights in one’s 
creation rather than an acknowledgement of the legal existence of 
moral rights.244  “Where, however, the parties have entered into a 
contract . . . [any] so-called ‘moral right’ is controlled by the law 
of contract.”245 
To the extent that an employment relationship exists and 
copyright ownership vests in the employer rather than the artist, 
 
 240 See id. (citing Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952)).  The Granz case held 
that “although the purchaser of the plaintiff’s master record discs could lawfully use, 
produce, and sell abbreviated versions of the records, to publicly attribute them to the 
plaintiff without express contractual authorization would constitute unfair competition.” 
Id. 
 241 See id. at 315 n.133 (citing Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 23–24 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(holding that disputed mutilations to Monty Python’s work might deter viewers from 
becoming Monty Python fans and thus constituted false representation under the Lanham 
Act; additionally, “the Lanham Act was violated by a representation that, while 
technically correct, creates a false impression of a product’s origin”)); Geisel v. Poynter 
Prod., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that use of the pseudonym 
“Dr. Seuss” on the advertising and sale of dolls, without authorization, constituted false 
designations of origin under the Lanham Act). 
 242 See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24–26 (citing Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952) 
(holding that, as a matter of contract, an obligation to mention the name of the author 
carries with it the implied duty not to make such changes in the work as would render the 
credit line a false attribution of authorship)). 
 243 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 221, at 957 (citing Clevenger v. Baker Voorhis 
& Co., 8 N.Y.2d 187, 189, 192 (1960) (holding that a publisher had impaired the 
reputation of an author by publishing an error-ridden edition of his book without 
indicating that the author had not performed the revision, as “the purchase of the 
copyright did not carry with it a license to defame”)). 
 244 See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24 (citing Gardella v. Log Cabin Prods. Co., 89 F.2d 891, 
895–96 (2d Cir. 1937)). “[T]he Lanham Act does not deal with artistic integrity.  It only 
goes to misdescription of origin and the like.” Id. at 27 (Gurfein, J., concurring). 
 245 Edison v. Viva Int’l, Ltd., 421 N.Y.S.2d 203, 206 (App. Div. 1979) (holding that 
plaintiff’s moral right to protection had been subsumed in his contractual right to seek 
redress for the alleged mutilation of his article); see also Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 27 
(Gurfein, J., concurring) (noting that if the “licensee may, by contract, distort the 
recorded work, the Lanham Act does not come into play”); McGuire v. United Artists 
Television Prods., Inc., 254 F. Supp. 270, 271–72 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (holding that where 
there was a contract, the artist’s right of artistic control was lost absent express 
reservation by the artist within the contract, regardless of the custom of the film industry). 
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the right to attribution is relinquished unless expressly reserved.246  
In a work-for-hire situation, listing authorship credit under the 
corporate name “accurately reflects the legal state of affairs.”247  
“[A]ll U.S. creators working in an employment relationship will, 
on account of that employment status, be most challenged to 
vindicate, under copyright law, any of the quasi-moral rights” 
recognized by U.S. courts.248 
III. REALITIES: THE CONTROL CONUNDRUM 
The Graham ruling is significant to both artists and legal 
practitioners because it establishes that artists employed by 
nonprofit organizations, even those organizations that they 
themselves have created, are not exempt from the work-for-hire 
doctrine.249  While Graham is also one of the few cases to deal 
with a dance copyright issue, it arguably sets a precedent not only 
for choreographers, but also for artists creating in other genres 
while employed by nonprofit organizations.  This precedent, 
however, is not as “dangerous” as it may seem to many artists.  
Artists do not necessarily give up all rights to their creations by 
forming nonprofit organizations to finance and facilitate their 
works, even following the Second Circuit’s ruling that an artist 
creating under the aegis of a nonprofit organization had ceded 
authorship status to the nonprofit employer.250 
 
 246 Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1260 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Vargas v. Esquire, 
Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 524–27 (7th Cir.1947) (holding that an artist could not claim a right 
of attribution against a magazine where the artist was found to have granted the magazine 
all rights to his drawings in exchange for monthly compensation)); Nelson v. Radio 
Corp., 148 F. Supp. 1, 3 (S.D. Fla. 1957) (denying a singer a right to attribution in the 
absence of an agreement to provide label credit, where the singer was found to be an 
employee of the recording company). 
 247 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 216, § 8D.03(A)(3) (citing Dun & Bradstreet Corp. 
v. Harpercollins Publ’rs, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)); see also Graham IV, 
380 F.3d 624, 638 n.30 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. 
Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-1277) (holding that a copyright notice in the Center’s name was 
sufficient to preserve Graham’s copyright even though the work was not determined to be 
a work for hire) (citing Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397, 402–03 
(2d Cir. 1970)). 
 248 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 216, § 8D.02(D)(1). 
 249 See generally supra Part II.A. 
 250 See generally supra Part II.A. 
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A. Nonprofit Organizations Promote Artists’ Economic and 
Artistic Interests 
Graham made a conscious choice in the nonprofit structure of 
the Center because of the many benefits it provided.251  In 1957, 
Graham wrote: 
The [Center] has made a legal arrangement with me by 
means of which they ‘buy’ the school and my name. . . . I 
am in a position to solicit funds from large foundations 
because [the Center] is tax exempt.  Also the [Center] takes 
over matters of management. . . . There is not much more 
money availabel [sic] but there is so much less worry and 
fear because it is well taken care of and the future is better 
arranged for than ever before.252 
She chose to establish and rely on a nonprofit organization so 
that she would not have to deal with financial and legal matters, 
freeing her to focus on creative endeavors,253 and she recognized 
that, “[f]or the future there must always be the security of a place 
to work for people like us.”254 
“[T]he policy reason for granting copyright protection to 
choreographic works is to encourage production of choreographic 
works that will inure to the public benefit.”255  The purposes of 
 
 251 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 640 (“Graham went to great lengths to become an 
employee of the Center so that she could insulate herself from the legal and financial 
aspects of her work.”). 
 252 Brief for Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellees at 2, Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624 
(2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-9451(L)) (citations omitted) (quoting a letter from Graham to her 
mother).  In the letter, Graham also explained, “I shall have a salary over the years 
regardless of the intake of the school.” Dunning, Dance and Profit, supra note 4. 
 253 See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 629 (finding that Graham began relying on nonprofit 
corporations, which she led, to support her work “for tax reasons and because she wanted 
to extricate herself from funding and legal matters”); Brief for Defendants-Counter-
Claimants-Appellees at 2, Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-9451(L)) 
(noting that Graham was “clear-sighted enough to take steps” to ensure her legacy and 
free her time for creative endeavors, “leaving the financial and practical worries to 
others”). 
 254 Brief for Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellees at 3, Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624 
(2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-9451(L)) (quoting Joint Appendix A2977). 
 255 Thomas J. Overton, Comment, Unraveling the Choreographer’s Copyright 
Dilemma, 49 TENN. L. REV. 594, 597 (1982).  “The copyright laws are clearly intended to 
provide economic incentives to produce artistic works, and the legislative objective 
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copyright protection can be well served by allowing copyright to 
vest in a nonprofit organization, especially an artist-driven 
organization established for the purpose of supporting the 
development of work by a particular artist and maintaining, 
protecting, and preserving that work.256  The physical author’s 
interests may be furthered by this arrangement as well, especially 
when the artist and the nonprofit organization have a shared 
interest and a symbiotic relationship.  Thus, the motivating factors 
in the choice of the nonprofit structure are often the same as the 
reasons why the nonprofit may be better equipped to protect and 
secure the work. 
Nonprofits must reinvest any profits into their programs.257  In 
the case of an artist-centered organization, the nonprofit’s 
programs are integrally tied to the founding artist’s work.258  This 
reinvestment generally translates into the financing of further 
creative works by the founding artist;259 thus, the artist reaps the 
benefit of the economic right, and the copyright serves its purpose 
as an impetus for creativity.  In the case of the Center, income 
from the performance and the licensing of Graham’s dances helped 
to finance rehearsal space, dancer salaries, and other resources 
utilized by Graham for the creation of subsequent works.260  The 
nonprofit structure also provides the artist with other financial 
resources—such as the ability to solicit contributions and generate 
tax-free revenue—which provide additional support for the 
creation of new work.261 
Nonprofit organizations have perpetual life.262  They are 
empowered to outlive their founders and thus can give creative 
 
behind the copyright laws is to bring as many new works into the public domain as 
possible.” Id. at 611 (citation omitted). 
 256 See, e.g., supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 257 See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 204 (McKinney 1997 & Supp. 2005); 
BJORKLUND ET AL., supra note 62, § 1-2; supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
 258 See supra notes 24, 64–65 and accompanying text. 
 259 See supra notes 24, 62–65 and accompanying text. 
 260 See supra notes 150–51, 161, 186–87 and accompanying text. 
 261 See supra notes 54–61 and accompanying text. 
 262 N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 202(a)(1). 
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work a life beyond the natural life of a founding artist.263  
Although there is some debate as to whether all artists want their 
works to live on after their deaths,264 and though it has been 
posited that Graham “may have subconsciously wished to take her 
work with her to the grave,”265 Graham expressed a clear desire for 
the Center to continue after her death.  “So deeply concerned am I 
for the future of my work and that the Martha Graham Center goes 
on,” Graham wrote, “that I have ensured through my attorney that 
the technique and the ballets will continue to be available and used 
by the Martha Graham Company and School.”266  In her will, 
Graham also named the Center as the sole contingent 
beneficiary267 and “requested that, in lieu of a funeral or memorial 
service, ‘contributions be made to the Martha Graham Center of 
Contemporary Dance, Inc. to support that which has played such a 
rich and meaningful part in my life.’”268 
 
 263 One of the reasons for the establishment of the Center was to “perpetuat[e] and 
preserv[e] Graham’s work after her death.” Brief for Defendants-Counter-Claimants-
Appellees at 10, Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-9451(L)); see also 
Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 43 Fed. Appx. 408 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
 264 See Singer, supra note 72, at 301 n.61. 
The late George Balanchine viewed his ballets as “butterflies” destined to live 
for a season.  In answer to a question concerning the preservation of his ballets, 
Balanchine once remarked, “They don’t have to be preserved.  Why should 
they be?  I think ballet is NOW.  It’s about people who are NOW.  Not about 
what will be.  Because as soon as you don’t have these bodies to work with, it’s 
already finished.” 
Id. (quoting George Balanchine, Work In Progress, in DANCE AS A THEATRE ART: 
SOURCE READINGS IN DANCE HISTORY FROM 1581 TO THE PRESENT 187, 192 (Selma Jean 
Cohen ed., 1975)).  And yet, more than two decades after his death, Balanchine’s works 
continue to be performed by major ballet companies around the world. See George 
Balanchine, at http://www.balanchine.org/01/index.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).  
Eighty-seven works are currently in active repertory. See Ballets in Active Repertory, at 
http://www.balanchine.org/01/activerep.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2004). 
 265 Carman, supra note 82.  “Choreographers . . . rarely wish to deal with the 
consequences of their deaths.” Jowitt, supra note 44. 
 266 Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 521 (quoting a September 14, 1990 letter written by 
Ron Protas on behalf of Martha Graham to Jim McGarry “concerning a potentially 
negative article that was to be written by Laura Shapiro of Newsweek”). 
 267 Brief for Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellees at 11, Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624 
(2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-9451(L)); see also supra note 39. 
 268 Brief for Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellees at 12, Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624 
(2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-9451(L)).  In a letter to Jerome Robbins shortly before her death 
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Not only are artists’ interests upheld by this arrangement, but 
the artist may still retain ultimate artistic control, even if divested 
of personal economic ownership.  Representatives of the dance 
community have argued that “depriving [the] artist of all rights in 
the work, including the rights to create derivative works, to 
perform, publicly display, license and otherwise control the work 
does great damage to the organization’s mission, and to the author 
personally.”269  If the artist controls the board of directors, 
however—either through actual, acknowledged control or through 
a more subtle sense of deference to the artist’s wishes—the artist 
would likely remain in control of the work even if the nonprofit 
organization were to hold the copyright.  It was established that 
Graham controlled the activities of the Center;270 thus, it stands to 
reason that she retained ultimate control over its property, which, 
according to the court, included her dances.271  Even pure 
employee status would allow the artist to act as an agent of the 
organization and make decisions regarding the use of her works; in 
hiring her as Artistic Director, the board would have vested in 
Graham the authority to make artistic decisions.272 
B. Artists’ Rights as Distinct from Successors’ Rights 
It is worth noting that the Graham case was not a dispute 
between a nonprofit organization and the artist that had created the 
works in question, but rather a dispute with that artist’s legatee.273  
In a copyright dispute similar to that between Protas and the 
Center, but between a living artist and a nonprofit organization, 
many other issues would likely come into play.  If board members 
were denying a founding artist any control over her works, this 
 
in 1991, Graham also wrote that “the company must continue now and in the future.” 
Carman, supra note 82. 
 269 Brief of Amici Curiae American Dance Festival, Inc. et al. at 11, Graham IV, 380 
F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-9451(L)). 
 270 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 271 See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d in part, 380 F.3d 
624 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 272 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 43 (2004) (“Acquiescence by the 
principal in conduct of an agent whose previously conferred authorization reasonably 
might include it, indicates that the conduct was authorized; if clearly not included in the 
authorization, acquiescence in it indicates affirmance.”). 
 273 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
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action might cause concern among funding organizations or could 
potentially be construed as a breach of the board’s duty to uphold 
the mission of the organization, because a board could not claim to 
be furthering the development of an artist’s work while divesting 
the artist of any control over that same work.  Although the work-
for-hire doctrine may require that the nonprofit be acknowledged 
as the “statutory author” for copyright purposes,274 a living artist 
would likely have other avenues for redress.  Where underlying 
equitable considerations—such as who deserved to own the 
works—weighed against Protas in his dispute with the Center, 
these same considerations would likely weigh in favor of a living 
artist in a dispute with a nonprofit organization over either control 
or ownership of the artist’s works. 
The Second Circuit’s use of the work-for-hire doctrine could 
potentially be interpreted as nothing more than a constraint on the 
artist’s right to transfer copyright ownership at the time of her 
death.  Admittedly a limitation on ownership, this restriction might 
be viewed as a fair exchange for the benefits provided by the 
nonprofit organization.  “Ms. Graham obtained crucial public 
support for her creative enterprise by forming corporations that 
could take advantage of tax exempt, tax-deductible treatment. . . . 
It is important that the public also receive the benefit of this 
bargain, so that her great achievements can be perpetuated by the 
charities she founded.”275 
C. Artistic Control and the “Moral” Aspects of Economic Rights 
Apart from the control an artist may wield via her leadership 
role within a nonprofit organization, artists retain intrinsic moral 
 
 274 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 275 Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer 
Says Court Ruling Will Preserve Martha Graham Dance Legacy (July 5, 2002) (quoting 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer as he hailed the Second Circuit’s earlier decision in the 
Graham case, Graham II, 43 Fed. Appx. 408, 410 (2d Cir. 2002),  as “a unanimous 
federal appeals court ruling upholding the rights of two charities, the Martha Graham 
School of Contemporary Dance and the Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance, 
to continue to operate according to the wishes of the legendary dancer”), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/jul/jul05a_02.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2005). 
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rights as well.276  To artists, there is definite value in rights of 
artistic control.277  Artistic control as recognized among artists is 
essentially the enforcement of the moral facets of the economic 
rights of copyright.  Although traditional moral rights, as such, are 
not widely recognized in the United States,278 the essence of these 
moral rights can be found within U.S. economic rights.  Each of 
the economic rights of copyright may be said to have a moral 
component, and if the strictly economic element of each right 
could be detached, a moral right would remain. 
It is inherent that the economic rights secured by copyright 
may also be asserted in the negative, thus guaranteeing that an 
author has the right to not reproduce, not prepare derivative works, 
not distribute copies, not perform, and not display.279  These 
negative rights may be equated with artistic control over the work.  
Additionally, traditional moral rights infuse the basic economic 
rights.  All of the rights secured by copyright carry with them the 
right of attribution, such that the party in control of these rights 
may require that appropriate credit be given in any licensed use of 
a right.280  The right to prepare derivative works also encompasses 
the right to control the creation of derivative works by other 
parties, which equates with a right of integrity.281  The right to not 
perform or display is in essence the right to withhold or withdraw 
the work from the public, like the European withdrawal right.282  
Due to the founding artist’s influence within a nonprofit 
organization, the deference accorded the artist’s wishes, and the 
 
 276 “A statement from the Max Planck Institute avers that ‘each moral right has what is 
called a “positive nucleus,” which is regarded as being so vital to the expression of the 
respective personality that any waiver would be null and void.’” NIMMER & NIMMER, 
supra note 216, § 8D.01(A) n.30 (quoting Register of Copyrights, Technological 
Alterations to Motion Pictures 78 n.134 (1989)). 
 277 See Singer, supra note 72, at 307.  “It all comes down to this: if you put your name 
on something, you should be there.” GRAHAM, supra note 1, at 14. 
 278 See discussion supra Part II.C.2. 
 279 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 280 See supra notes 226–28 and accompanying text. 
 281 See supra notes 229–31 and accompanying text. 
 282 See supra notes 232–33 and accompanying text. 
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artist’s unique ability to utilize these rights, the artist herself 
remains in control of the moral elements of economic rights.283 
The custom of the American dance community provides 
choreographers with an effective mechanism for the 
acknowledgement and enforcement of their moral rights.284  The 
right of paternity is upheld through enduring choreographic 
credit.285  “The choreographer’s name attaches to his work at the 
first and all subsequent performances of the work, whether or not 
the choreographer, his company, or another company has legal 
ownership of the piece.”286  Dance community custom recognizes 
the artist’s rights to preserve the integrity of his work, even after he 
has relinquished control of the economic rights to that work, as 
evidenced in choreographers’ ability to withdraw a licensed work 
due to artistic concerns.287 
“[T]he primary interest of choreographers in maintaining the 
artistic integrity of their works conflicts with the Copyright Act’s 
favoring of economic benefits at the expense of artistic 
 
 283 Such control would necessarily be limited to the extent it might infringe on the 
“public benefit” provided by the nonprofit organization. See supra notes 57, 255 and 
accompanying text.  Where a choreographer’s decision to withdraw a single work from a 
dance company’s repertoire would likely be deferred to as an aesthetic choice, a 
choreographer’s attempt to withdraw her entire body of work from public presentation 
might be interpreted as threatening the existence of the nonprofit organization. Cf. supra 
Part II.B. 
 284 See Singer, supra note 72, at 318. 
 285 See id. at 292. 
 286 Id. at 292–93.  Marius Petipa’s name, for example, is still linked to the classic ballet 
Sleeping Beauty, which was first performed in 1890, even though the choreography has 
undergone many changes since its first performance and the work has long since been in 
the public domain. See id. at 293 n.22. 
 287 See id. at 310, 318.  George Balanchine was known to withdraw works from licensee 
companies’ repertories when the artistic director to whom he had licensed the works left 
the dance company. See id. at 310 n.107 (citations omitted). 
When the Pennsylvania Ballet forced its artistic director, Barbara Weisberger, 
to resign in February 1982, Balanchine promptly notified the company that he 
intended to withdraw his ballets from the company’s repertoire.  Balanchine 
explained that he had originally given the works to Weisberger (a Balanchine 
protégé), and since she was no longer in charge of “her” company, he did not 
wish to have his ballets performed by them. . . . Balanchine also withdrew 
works from the Pacific Northwest Ballet when former NYCB principal Melissa 
Hayden left that company. 
Id. 
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concerns.”288  Since copyright law does not acknowledge these 
rights of control that are of the utmost importance to artists, the 
repercussions of a determination of copyright ownership are 
limited and, as a matter of practice or custom, control of such 
rights does not necessarily vest in the “statutory author.” 
D. Contracting for Control 
A nonprofit organization is not required to assert its work-for-
hire rights against a founding artist; yet, in light of the issues 
unearthed by the Graham case, artists creating work while 
employed by nonprofit organizations would be well advised to 
validate their ownership assumptions in writing.  “[T]he initial 
ownership of rights in a work made for hire are only presumed to 
be in the employer . . . , which presumption may be rebutted by an 
express agreement in writing between the parties.”289  Since 
founding artists generally exert control over nonprofit dance 
companies and other artist-driven organizations, these artists are in 
a strong bargaining position and should be able to contract for an 
arrangement that reflects their wishes.  In response to the concerns 
raised by the Graham ruling, Dance/NYC, a service organization 
for the dance community, has drafted several model intellectual 
property agreements290 which may suffice for most dance artists’ 
needs.  With an eye toward fairness in light of potential private 
inurement issues, and being mindful not to reap a personal profit at 
the expense of the nonprofit organization, the artist should be able 
to own and/or control the rights to her work within the confines of 
both copyright and nonprofit law. 
 
 288 Singer, supra note 72, at 304. 
 289 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 216, § 5.03(D); see also supra notes 146, 169 and 
accompanying text.  “If such a presumption were not rebuttable, a serious issue of 
constitutional validity would be raised.” NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 216, § 5.03(D).  
As the Constitution ‘‘authorizes only the enactment of legislation securing ‘authors’ the 
exclusive right of their writings, [i]t would thus be quite doubtful that Congress could 
grant employers the exclusive right to the writings of employees regardless of the 
circumstances.” Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 1969). 
 290 See Contract Templates, at http://www.dancenyc.org/dancers.asp?file=contract (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2005).  See in particular the “Letter of Agreement covering work created 
in the past or to be created in the future by the artistic director/choreographer of a single 
choreographer company.” Id. 
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In contracting for the rights to their work, choreographers 
should give careful consideration to their ultimate goals.  Although 
an artist may choose to contract for full ownership of all economic 
and moral rights, she should keep in mind the potential artistic 
repercussions if her heir or legatee should be uncooperative or if 
she should die intestate and without an heir.291  It is conceivable 
that choreographic rights would be better protected in the hands of 
a nonprofit organization with a board dedicated to nurturing and 
preserving the artist’s work, than in the hands of the artist’s chosen 
beneficiary, statutory heir, or a disinterested party chosen to 
dispose of intestate assets.292  As an alternative to retaining full 
copyright ownership, an artist might choose to allow the copyright 
to vest in the nonprofit organization, while contracting for a 
consultation right or, better yet, some level of control over 
exploitation of one or more of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
holder.  This would in essence be a contract for the artist to retain 
moral rights.  Retention of these rights should not raise a private 
inurement issue, since these rights do not hold a legally 
acknowledged economic value. 
CONCLUSION 
The Second Circuit’s ruling is not cause for alarm among 
artists.  Where an artist is the primary creative force behind a 
nonprofit organization, the artist will generally retain artistic 
control regardless of who holds the copyright, the economic rights 
of the nonprofit organization will ultimately benefit the artist, and 
 
 291 Choreographer Erick Hawkins, for example, died without leaving a will. See Jennifer 
Dunning, Forum Asks, Who Owns A Dance?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2002, at E1.  Upon his 
death in 1994, his wife and collaborator, Lucia Dlugoszewski, inherited his work and 
took over the supervision of the Erick Hawkins Dance Company. Id.  When 
Dlugoszewski died in 2000, also without a will, the company seemed to die with her, and 
the disposition of Hawkins’ dances was left up to the public administrator. Id. 
 292 Choreographer Paul Taylor has decided that his works will go to his company, the 
Paul Taylor Dance Company, after his death. See Jennifer Dunning, Graham Company 
Leaps Back to Life; But After a Favorable Court Ruling, Questions Linger About 
Choreographers’ Legacies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2002, at E1. “‘The thing about 
[Graham’s] works going to the company seems right to me, . . . [n]ot just because she 
was an employee of the company and the company therefore owns the dances.  That 
seems logical.  But I’m real glad the dances will be seen.’” Id. (quoting Paul Taylor). 
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informal recognition of “moral rights” within the field likely will 
not change as a result of Graham.293  The Graham case should, 
however, alert artists to the importance of carefully considering 
their intentions for the future of their work as well as the need to 
memorialize these intentions in writing. 
In the end, most choreographers will never be faced with such 
a controversy over the rights to their legacy.  According to 
choreographer Eliot Feld, “I wish people were stealing my work 
left and right, and it became an enormous issue for me. . . . The 
idea that any of us would share the problem that Martha’s work has 
engendered is presumptuous beyond belief.”294  No one can predict 
the future, however, and the financial climate for dance is 
constantly evolving.295  It is important for choreographers to 
consider the future and make arrangements for the rights to their 
works as if that work might someday be the subject of such a 
dispute.  As an emerging choreographer in the early twentieth 
century, even Martha Graham could not have predicted the chaos 
that would ensue after her death. 
 
 
 
 293 But see generally Sarah Kutner & Holly Rich, Note, Dirty Dancing: Attributing the 
Moral Right of Attribution to American Copyright Law: The Work-for-Hire Doctrine and 
the Usurping of the Ultimate Grand Dame and Founder of Modern Dance, Martha 
Graham, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 325 (analyzing similar issues but reaching a 
contrary conclusion). 
 294 Carman, supra note 82.  “Martha was and is a transformer of dance of the first 
order.” Id. (quoting Eliot Feld). 
 295 See generally Dunning, Dance and Profit, supra note 4. 
This is definitely a success problem. . . . These problems would never have 
existed 50 years ago, because the concept of a penny being made by a 
choreographer or from a dance was unheard of.  So now that the commercial 
aspect of making money has prevailed in this nonprofit world of dance, and the 
valuable asset is the dance itself—hey, that’s a success story. 
Id. (quoting Charles Reinhart, director of the American Dance Festival). 
